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Summary
Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the
national interest in reducing the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver
them.  Recipients of China’s technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries
that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea.  This
CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the national security problem of
China’s role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response,
including legislation, since the mid-1990s.  China has taken some steps to mollify
U.S. concerns about its role in weapons proliferation.  Nonetheless, supplies from
China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous
capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation.  As
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has reported to Congress, China remains
a “key supplier” of weapons technology, particularly missile or chemical technology.
Policy issues in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions,
and satellite exports.  On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to
waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites
to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return
for another promise from China on missile nonproliferation.  However, PRC
proliferation activities again raised questions about sanctions.  On 16 occasions, the
Bush Administration has imposed sanctions on PRC entities (not the government)
for transfers (related to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and cruise missiles) to
Pakistan, Iran, or another country.  The latest sanctions were imposed on June 13,
2006.  (See Table 1, summarizing U.S. sanctions imposed on PRC entities.)  Among
those sanctions, on September 1, 2001, the Administration imposed missile
proliferation sanctions that effectively denied satellite exports (for two years), after
a PRC company transferred technology to Pakistan, despite the November 2000
promise.  On September 19, 2003, the State Department imposed more missile
proliferation sanctions on NORINCO, a defense industrial firm, denying satellite
exports to China.  However, the State Department has extended a waiver for the ban
on imports of other PRC government products related to missiles, space systems,
electronics, and military aircraft, with the latest extension on March 18, 2006.
Skeptics question whether China’s cooperation in weapons nonproliferation has
warranted President Bush’s pursuit of stronger bilateral ties.  The Administration has
imposed repeated sanctions on “entities” but not the PRC government.  The House
International Relations Committee held a hearing on May 18, 2004, to question U.S.
support for China’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group despite PRC ties
with Pakistan.  China has not joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  Since
2002, Bush has relied on China’s “considerable influence” on North Korea to
dismantle its nuclear weapons.  China sponsored a Statement of the Six-Party Talks
of September 19, 2005, but results remain elusive.  China has pursued balanced
positions on Iran and North Korea, but voted in July 2006 for U.N. Security Council
resolutions on North Korea and Iran that included language on possible sanctions.
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China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues
Purpose and Scope
Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the U.S.
interest in reducing the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles and obtaining
China’s cooperation in weapons nonproliferation.  This problem refers to the threat
of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and missiles that could deliver them.
Some have argued that certain PRC transfers violated international treaties or
guidelines, and/or have contravened various U.S. laws requiring sanctions to shore
up those international standards.  Even if no laws or treaties are violated, many view
China’s transfers as threatening U.S. security interests.  Using a variety of
unclassified consultations and sources, this CRS Report discusses the national
security problem of the PRC’s role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the
U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s.  Table 1, at the end
of this report, summarizes the U.S. sanctions imposed or waived on PRC entities or
the PRC government for weapons proliferation.
For a discussion of the policy problem in the 1980s to 1996, see CRS Report
96-767, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and
Analysis, by Shirley Kan.  See also, by the same author, CRS Report 98-485, China:
Possible Missile Technology Transfers Under U.S. Satellite Export Policy — Actions
and Chronology.
PRC Proliferation Challenges
Nonproliferation Commitments but Continued Concerns
Since 1991, Beijing has taken steps to address U.S. and other countries’
concerns by increasing its partial participation in international nonproliferation
regimes and issuing export control regulations.  However, questions have remained.
China first promised tentatively to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) in November 1991 and February1992 and later reaffirmed that commitment
in an October 4, 1994 joint statement with the United States.  The MTCR, set up in
1987, is not an international agreement and has no legal authority, leaving issues
about U.S. sanctions to shore up the standards unresolved.  It is a set of voluntary
guidelines that seeks to control the transfer of ballistic and cruise missiles that are
inherently capable of delivering at least a 500 kg (1,100 lb) payload to at least 300
km (186 mi), called “Category I” or “MTCR-class” missiles.  It was unclear whether
China adhered to the revised MTCR guidelines of 1993 calling for the presumption
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to deny transfers of any missiles capable of delivering any WMD (not just nuclear
weapons).  A 1996 State Department fact sheet said that China unilaterally
committed to controlling exports “consistent with the MTCR Guidelines and
Annex,” with the MTCR consisting of a common export control policy (Guidelines)
applied to a common list of controlled items (Annex).  However, a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee report of September 11, 2000, said the State Department had
argued to Congress that China agreed to the MTCR Guidelines, but not the Annex.
On November 21, 2000, Beijing said that it has no intention of assisting any
other country in developing ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear
weapons (missiles with payloads of at least 500 kg and ranges of at least 300 km) and
promised to issue missile-related export controls “as soon as possible.”  After a
contentious period that saw new U.S. sanctions, the PRC finally published those
regulations and the control list (modeled on the MTCR) on August 25, 2002, as
Washington and Beijing prepared for a Bush-Jiang summit on October 25, 2002.
China acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on March 9, 1992.
The NPT does not ban peaceful nuclear projects.  On May 11, 1996, the PRC issued
a statement promising to make only safeguarded nuclear transfers.  China, on July 30,
1996, began a moratorium on nuclear testing and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996 but (like the United States) has not ratified it.
Premier Li Peng issued nuclear export control regulations on September 10, 1997.
On October 16, 1997, China joined the Zangger Committee (on nuclear trade).  Also
in October 1997, China promised not to start new nuclear cooperation with Iran.  On
June 6, 1998, the U.N. Security Council (including China) adopted  Resolution 1172,
asking states to prevent exports to India or Pakistan’s nuclear weapon or missile
programs.  The PRC issued regulations on dual-use nuclear exports on June 17, 1998.
In May 2004, China applied to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which
accepted China as a member after the Bush Administration decided to support China,
despite congressional concerns.
In November 1995, China issued its first public defense white paper, which
focused on arms control and disarmament.  Also, China signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) in January 1993.  On April 25, 1997, China deposited
its instrument of ratification of the CWC, before it entered into force on April 29,
1997.  From 1993 to1998, the PRC issued export control regulations on chemicals.
On October 14, 2002, on the eve of a Bush-Jiang summit, the PRC issued regulations
for export controls over dual-use biological agents and related technology.  On
December 3, 2003, China issued a white paper on nonproliferation, which stated that
its control lists are almost the same as those of the Zangger Committee, NSG, CWC,
Australia Group, and MTCR.
Nevertheless, China is not a member of the MTCR or the Australia Group (AG)
(on chemical and biological weapons).  (In June 2004, China expressed willingness
to join the MTCR.)  China did not join the 93 countries in signing the International
Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation in The Hague on November
25, 2002.  China has not joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced
by President Bush on May 31, 2003.  PRC weapons proliferation has persisted,
aggravating trends that result in more ambiguous technical assistance, longer range
missiles, more indigenous capabilities, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation.
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The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) noted that, for July-December 1996,
“China was the most significant supplier of WMD-related goods and technology to
foreign countries.”  As required by Section 721 of the FY1997 Intelligence
Authorization Act, P.L. 104-293, the DCI’s report to Congress, “Unclassified Report
to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,” has named China (plus Russia
and North Korea) as “key suppliers” of dangerous technology.  (Subsequent
discussions of the DCI’s report refer to this reporting requirement.  Original
legislation required a semi-annual report, and the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization
Act, P.L. 108-177, changed the requirement to an annual report.)
Nuclear Technology Sales to Pakistan
Ring Magnets.  In 1996, some in Congress called for sanctions after reports
disclosed that China sold unsafeguarded ring magnets to Pakistan, apparently in
violation of the NPT and in contradiction of U.S. laws, including the Arms Export
Control Act (P.L. 90-629) and Export-Import Bank Act (P.L. 79-173), as amended
by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (Title VIII of P.L. 103-236).  On
February 5, 1996, the Washington Times disclosed intelligence reports that the China
National Nuclear Corporation, a state-owned corporation, transferred to the A.Q.
Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, 5,000 ring magnets that can be used
in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium.  Reportedly, intelligence experts believed that
the magnets provided to Pakistan were to be used in special suspension bearings at
the top of rotating cylinders in the centrifuges.  The New York Times, on May 12,
1996, reported that the shipment was made after June 1994 and was worth $70,000.
The PRC company involved was China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, a
subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation.  The State Department’s
report on nonproliferation efforts in South Asia (issued on January 21, 1997)
confirmed that “between late 1994 and mid-1995, a Chinese entity transferred a large
number of ring magnets to Pakistan for use in its uranium enrichment program.”
The Clinton Administration’s decision-making was complicated by
considerations of  U.S. corporations doing business in China.  Officials reportedly
considered imposing then waiving sanctions or focusing sanctions only on the China
National Nuclear Corporation, rather than large-scale sanctions affecting the entire
PRC government and U.S. companies, such as Westinghouse Electric Corporation
(which had deals pending with China National Nuclear Corporation) and Boeing
Aircraft Company. At the end of February 1996, Secretary of State Warren
Christopher instructed the Export-Import Bank to suspend financing for commercial
deals in China for one month, reported the New York Times (February 29, 1996).
Christopher reportedly required time to try to obtain more information to make a
determination of whether sanctions would be required.  Meanwhile, DCI John
Deutch reportedly said at a White House meeting that PRC officials at some level
likely approved the sale of magnets.  Defense Secretary William Perry supported this
view, but officials of the Commerce and Treasury Departments and the U.S. Trade
Representative argued there was lack of solid proof, according to the Washington
Post (April 1, 1996).
On May 10, 1996, the State Department announced that China and Pakistan
would not be sanctioned, citing a new agreement with China.  Clinton Administration
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officials said that China promised to provide future assistance only to safeguarded
nuclear facilities, reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, and agreed
to consultations on export control and proliferation issues.  The Administration also
said that PRC leaders insisted they were not aware of the magnet transfer and that
there was no evidence that the PRC government had willfully aided or abetted
Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program through the magnet transfer.  Thus, the State
Department announced that sanctions were not warranted, and Export-Import Bank
considerations of loans for U.S. exporters to China were returned to normal.  On May
11, 1996, China’s foreign ministry issued a statement that “China will not provide
assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.”  In any case, since 1984, China has
declared a policy of nuclear nonproliferation and a requirement for recipients of its
transfers to accept IAEA safeguards, and China acceded to the NPT in 1992.
That year, Congress responded to the Administration’s determination not to
impose sanctions by adding language on “persons” in the Export-Import Bank Act,
as amended by Section 1303 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1997
(P.L. 104-201), enacted on September 23, 1996.
Other Nuclear Cooperation.  On October 9, 1996, the Washington Times
reported that a CIA report dated September 14, 1996, said that China sold a “special
industrial furnace” and “high-tech diagnostic equipment” to unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities in Pakistan.  In September 1996, PRC technicians in Pakistan reportedly
prepared to install the dual-use equipment.  The deal was allegedly made by the
China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, the same firm which sold the ring
magnets.  Those who suspected that the transfer was intended for Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program said that high temperature furnaces are used to mold uranium or
plutonium.  The CIA report was said to state that “senior-level government approval
probably was needed” and that PRC officials planned to submit false documentation
on the final destination of the equipment.  According to the press, the CIA report said
that the equipment was set to arrive in early September 1996.  The Washington Post,
on October 10, 1996, further reported that the equipment was intended for a nuclear
reactor to be completed by 1998 at Khushab in Pakistan.  On October 9, 1996, the
State Department said that it had not concluded that China violated its promise of
May 11, 1996.  However, the State Department did not publicly address whether the
suspected transfers occurred before May 11, 1996, violated the NPT, or contradicted
U.S. laws (including the Arms Export Control Act, Export-Import Bank Act, and the
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act).
Concerns have persisted about PRC assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.
As reported by Pakistani and PRC news sources in 1992, China began to build a
nuclear power plant at Chashma and was suspected in 1994 of helping Pakistan to
build an unsafeguarded, plutonium-producing reactor at Khushab, according to
Nucleonics Week (June 19, 1997 and February 26, 1998).  Operational since 2001,
the Chashma reactor has IAEA safeguards but not full scope safeguards (Nucleonics
Week, April 26, 2001; and IAEA, Annual Report 2001).  
Referring specifically to Pakistan’s efforts to acquire equipment, materials, and
technology for its nuclear weapons program, the DCI’s June 1997 report for the last
half of 1996 (after China’s May 1996 pledge) stated that China was the “principal
supplier.”  Then, on May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted nuclear tests, citing
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1  Mark Hibbs, “CIA Knew About Khushab D2O Plant but Not Source, Officials Claim,”
Nucleonics Week, March 23, 2000; “Pakistani Separation Plant Now Producing 8-10 Kg
Plutonium/Yr,” Nuclear Fuel, June 12, 2000.
2 “Pakistan, China Agree on Second Chashma Unit,” Nucleonics Week, May 6, 2004.
3 David Sanger and William Broad, “From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads
to Pakistan,” New York Times, January 4, 2004.
China’s nuclear ties to Pakistan, and Pakistan followed with nuclear tests on May 28
and 30, 1998.  China, as Pakistan’s principal military and nuclear supplier, failed to
avert the tests and did not cut off nuclear aid, but condemned the tests at the U.N.
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s annual report on arms control for
1998 stated that “there continued to be some contacts between Chinese entities and
Pakistan’s unsafeguarded and nuclear weapons program.” 
In 2000, news reports said that some former U.S. nonproliferation and
intelligence officials suspected that China provided equipment for Pakistan’s secret
heavy water production plant at Khushab, where an unsafeguarded reactor reportedly
started up in April 1998 and has generated weapons-grade plutonium.  Clinton
Administration officials at the White House and State Department reportedly denied
China’s involvement but said that they did not know the origins of the plant.1  The
DCI reported in November 2003 that, in the first half of 2003, continued contacts
between PRC entities and “entities associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program” cannot be ruled out, despite the PRC’s 1996 promise not to assist
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.  The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee
on February 24, 2004, that PRC entities “remain involved with nuclear and missile
programs in Pakistan and Iran,” while “in some cases,” the entities are involved
without the government’s knowledge, thus implying that there are cases in which the
PRC government has knowledge of the relationships.
On May 5, 2004, China signed a contract to build a second nuclear power
reactor (Chashma-2) in Pakistan.  This contract raised questions because of
continuing PRC nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and its signing right before a
decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on China’s membership.  With a pre-
existing contract, Chashma-2 would be exempted from the NSG’s requirement for
full-scope safeguards (not just IAEA safeguards on the reactor).2  (See
Nonproliferation Regimes below for policy discussion.)
A. Q. Khan.  China’s past and persisting connections to Pakistan’s nuclear
program have raised questions about whether China had involvement in or
knowledge about the long-time efforts, publicly confirmed in early 2004, of Abdul
Qadeer Khan, the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program, in selling
uranium enrichment technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.  DCI George Tenet
confirmed A.Q. Khan’s network of nuclear trade in open testimony to the Senate
Intelligence Committee on February 24, 2004.  
China’s association can be raised particularly because China was an early
recipient of the uranium enrichment technology Khan acquired in Europe.3  Also,
there are questions about whether China has shared intelligence with the United
CRS-6
4 Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough Calls,” Washington
Post, October 26, 2004.
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Post, February 15, 2004; William Broad and David Sanger, “As Nuclear Secrets Emerge in
Khan Inquiry, More Are Suspected,” New York Times, December 26, 2004.
6 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing on “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005:
Meeting Long-term Challenges with a Long-term Strategy,” February 16, 2005.
States about Khan’s nuclear technology transfers.  With the troubling disclosures,
China might be more willing to cooperate on nonproliferation or might remain
reluctant to confirm its involvement.  A senior Pakistani diplomat was quoted as
saying that, while in Beijing in 2002, PRC officials said they knew “A.Q. Khan was
in China and bribing people, and they wanted him out.”4  Particularly troubling has
been the reported intelligence finding in early 2004 that Khan sold Libya a nuclear
bomb design that he received from China in the early 1980s (in return for giving
China his centrifuge technology), a design that China had already tested in 1966 and
had developed as a compact nuclear bomb for delivery on a missile.5  That finding
raised the additional question of whether Khan also sold that bomb design to others,
including Iran and North Korea.  DCI Porter Goss testified in February 2005 that the
Bush Administration has continued to explore opportunities to learn about Khan’s
nuclear trade, adding that “getting to the end of that trail is extremely important for
us.  It is a serious proliferation question.”6
Missile Technology Sales to Pakistan
M-11 Missiles.  Transfers of the PRC’s M-11 short range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) or related equipment exceed MTCR guidelines, because the M-11 has the
inherent capability to deliver a 500 kg (1,100 lb) warhead to 300 km (186 mi).  Issues
about U.S. sanctions have included the questions of whether PRC transfers to
Pakistan involved M-11 missile-related technology (Category II of the MTCR) or
complete missiles (Category I).  Sanctions are mandated under Section 73(a) of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Section 11B(b)(1) of the Export
Administration Act (EAA) (as amended by the FY1991 National Defense
Authorization Act).
In June 1991, the Bush Administration first imposed sanctions on entities in
China for transferring M-11 technology to Pakistan.  Sanctions affected exports of
supercomputers, satellites, and missile technology.  The Administration later waived
the sanctions on March 23, 1992.  On August 24, 1993, the Clinton Administration
determined that China had again transferred M-11 equipment (not whole missiles)
to Pakistan and imposed new sanctions (affecting exports of some satellites).  On
October 4, 1994, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen signed a joint statement, saying that Washington would waive the August
1993 sanctions and Beijing would not export “ground-to-ground missiles”
“inherently capable” of delivering a 500 kg warhead 300 km.  The Administration
waived the sanctions on November 1, 1994.
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However, contentious policy questions about imposing sanctions for the 1992
transfer of complete M-11 SRBMs (not just components) persisted until 2000.  The
Washington Times (March 14, 1997) said “numerous” intelligence reports indicated
that M-11 missiles were “operational” in Pakistan, but these findings were disputed
by some policymakers.  Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued a Pentagon
report in 1997 stating that Pakistan acquired “SRBMs” as well as related equipment
from China in the early 1990s.7  In a 1998 report to Congress on nuclear
nonproliferation in South Asia, the State Department acknowledged its concerns
about “reports that M-11 missiles were transferred from China to Pakistan” but added
that it had not determined that such transfers occurred, “which would be sanctionable
under U.S. law.”8  Gordon Oehler, former head of the CIA’s Nonproliferation Center,
testified on June 11, 1998, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that in
November 1992, “the Chinese delivered 34 M-11s to Pakistan.”  In July 1998, the
Rumsfeld Commission said that China had transferred complete M-11s to Pakistan.9
Some said that sanctions were not imposed for transfers of complete M-11s,
because the missiles remained inside crates at Sagodha Air Base, according to the
Wall Street Journal (December 15, 1998).  Critics in Congress said the Clinton
Administration avoided making determinations of whether to impose sanctions, by
delaying tactics, re-writing reports, and setting high evidentiary standards.  The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report in September 2000, saying that
the Administration avoided such determinations through the use of “bureaucratic
maneuvers” to delay the drafting of “Statements/Findings of Fact” by the intelligence
community and to not schedule interagency meetings to consider those findings.10
On September 9, 1999, the intelligence community publicly confirmed for the
first time that “Pakistan has M-11 SRBMs from China” and that they may have a
nuclear role.11  However, the State Department argued on September 14, 1999, that
it required a “high standard of evidence” and had not yet determined that Category
I sanctions were warranted, despite the intelligence judgment.  (Category I sanctions
would deny licenses for exports of Munitions List items, among other actions, and
Congress  transferred satellites back to the Munitions List, effective March 15, 1999.)
The Far Eastern Economic Review reported on May 18, 2000, that the Clinton
Administration and Senator Helms of the Foreign Relations Committee struck a deal
in 1999 that required a decision on sanctions for the PRC’s —11 transfer to Pakistan
in exchange for the confirmation of Robert Einhorn as Assistant Secretary of State
for Nonproliferation (approved on November 3, 1999).  On November 21, 2000, the
Clinton Administration said it determined that PRC entities had transferred Category
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I and Category II missile-related items to Pakistani entities, and sanctions would be
waived on the PRC for past transfers, given its new missile nonproliferation promise.
Missile Plants and MRBMs. While China promised not to transfer missiles,
it has reportedly helped Pakistan to achieve an indigenous missile capability.  U.S.
intelligence reportedly concluded in a National Intelligence Estimate that China
provided blueprints and equipment to Pakistan to build a plant for making missiles
that would violate the MTCR, according to the Washington Post (August 25, 1996).
Analysts disagreed, however, about whether the plant would manufacture some major
missile components or whole copies of the M-11 missile.  Construction of the plant
allegedly began in 1995.  On August 25, 1996, Vice President Al Gore acknowledged
concerns about the plant.  Time reported on June 30, 1997, that the Clinton
Administration would not discuss possible sanctions based on intelligence on the
missile plant.  The November 1997 report of the Secretary of Defense also confirmed
Pakistan’s facility “for the production of a 300 kilometer range ballistic missile.”  By
1998, the missile plant in Fatehjung was almost finished, awaiting delivery of crucial
equipment from China, reported the Wall Street Journal (December 15, 1998).
On April 6, 1998, Pakistan first tested its nuclear-capable Ghauri (Hatf-5)
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which is based on the North Korean No
Dong missile.  U.S. intelligence was said to suspect that China Poly Ventures
Company delivered, perhaps in 1999, U.S.-made specialized metal-working presses
and a special furnace to Pakistan’s National Development Center, a missile plant,
reported the Washington Times (April 15, 1999).  China reportedly was building a
second missile plant and providing specialty steel, guidance systems, and technical
aid, said the Far Eastern Economic Review (June 22, 2000) and New York Times
(July 2, 2000).  Apparently confirming these stories, the DCI reported in August 2000
that, besides North Korean help, PRC entities provided “increased assistance” to
Pakistan’s ballistic missile program in the second half of 1999.  Also, China has
assisted Pakistan with development of the Shaheen-2 two-stage, solid-fuel MRBM,
reported Jane’s Defense Weekly (December 13, 2000).  DCI George Tenet confirmed
U.S. concerns about such assistance in testimony on February 7, 2001, before the
Senate Intelligence Committee, and in his February 2001 report on proliferation.
Despite the PRC’s November 2000 missile nonproliferation pledge, in the first
several months of 2001, a PRC company reportedly delivered 12 shipments of
missile components to Pakistan’s Shaheen-1 SRBM and Shaheen-2 MRBM
programs, according to the Washington Times (August 6, 2001).  On September 1,
2001, the State Department imposed sanctions on China Metallurgical Equipment
Corporation (CMEC) for proliferation of missile technology (Category II items of the
MTCR) to Pakistan.  In November 2004, the DCI reported that, in the second half of
2003, PRC entities helped Pakistan to advance toward serial production of solid-fuel
SRBMs (previously identified as the Shaheen-1, Abdali, and Ghaznavi) and
supported Pakistan’s development of solid-fuel MRBMs (previously noted as the
Shaheen-2 MRBM).
Nuclear Technology Sales to Iran
Suspecting that Iran uses nuclear technology to build the technical infrastructure
for its clandestine nuclear weapon program, Washington has urged Beijing (and
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Moscow) not to transfer any nuclear technology to Iran.  In 1995, China suspended
a sale of nuclear reactors to Iran.  Showing Israeli influence, Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu publicly stated in August 1997 that PRC Vice Premier Li
Lanqing said that China canceled plans to build the reactors.  
However, there were other controversial PRC nuclear deals with Iran pointing
to an Iranian nuclear weapon program.  PRC technicians built a calutron, or
electromagnetic isotope separation system, for enriching uranium at the Karaj nuclear
research facility, according to “confidential reports” submitted to Iranian President
Rafsanjani by his senior aides, according to the London Sunday Telegraph (as
reported in the September 25, 1995 Washington Times).  As reported, the PRC
system was similar to the one used in Iraq’s secret uranium enrichment program.
Secretary of Defense William Perry confirmed in an April 1996 report that “the
Iranians have purchased an electromagnetic isotope separation unit from China.”12
The China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation had plans to sell Iran a facility
to convert uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride gas, which could be enriched to
weapons-grade material, according to the Washington Post (April 17, 1995; June 20,
1996).  Intelligence reports said that the deal proceeded with PRC nuclear experts
going to Iran to build the new uranium conversion plant near Isfahan, reported the
Washington Times (April 17, 1996).  However, PRC civilian nuclear officials later
indicated to the IAEA and U.S. officials that China would not transfer the uranium
conversion facility, ostensibly because of Iran’s inability to pay, reported the
Washington Post (November 6, 1996).  China’s role as nuclear supplier may have
been affected by Iran’s turn to Russian reactors.  Also, China may have responded
to concerns of Israel (a key supplier to China’s military).  
1997 Promise.  China’s concerns about its standing with the United States
were also important.  State Department official Robert Einhorn told Congress that
China canceled this deal but had provided Iran with a blueprint to build the facility,
reported the Washington Post (September 18, 1997).  On the eve of a U.S.-China
summit in Washington in October 1997, PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
provided a secret letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, promising not to
begin new nuclear cooperation with Iran, after building a small nuclear research
reactor and a factory to fabricate zirconium cladding to encase fuel rods in nuclear
reactors, according to the Washington Post (October 30, 1997).  U.S. officials said
the projects would not be significant for nuclear proliferation.
After President Clinton signed certifications in January 1998 to implement the
1985 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, as promised at the 1997 summit, the
Washington Post (March 13, 1998) reported that at a closed hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on March 12, 1998, Clinton Administration officials
disclosed negotiations in January 1998 between the China Nuclear Energy Industry
Corporation and Iran’s Isfahan Nuclear Research Center to provide “a lifelong
supply” of hundreds of tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF), or hydrofluoric
acid, under falsified documents about end-users.  (The AHF chemical could be used
to produce uranium hexafluoride used in uranium conversion facilities.  AHF is also
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a precursor for the chemical weapon agent Sarin.)  According to the press, after
Washington protested, Beijing stopped the sale.  The Administration argued that
Beijing responded positively and that the chemical is controlled by the Australia
Group and not on a nuclear control list.  Later, an April 2, 1999 U.S. intelligence
report was said to suggest that the China Non-metallic Minerals Industrial
Import/Export Corporation “revived” negotiations with the Iranian Atomic Energy
Organization on the construction of a plant to produce graphite (used as a moderator
in some reactors), reported the Washington Times (April 15, 1999).
In a February 2001 report (on the first half of 2000), the DCI dropped an earlier
observation that the 1997 pledge appeared to be holding.  In testimony before the
Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation,
and Federal Services on June 6, 2002, Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf stated
concerns about possible PRC-Iranian interactions “despite China’s 1997 pledge to
end its nuclear cooperation with Iran.”
Uranium Enrichment.  In 2002, an Iranian opposition group reported that
Iranian front companies procured materials from China (and other countries) for
secret nuclear weapons facilities, while experts from China have worked at a uranium
mine at Saghand and a centrifuge facility (for uranium enrichment) near Isfahan,
reported the Washington Post (December 19, 2002 and February 20, 2003).
Moreover, Nucleonics Week (February 27 and March 6, 2003) reported that Iran,
since 2000, has been building a secret uranium enrichment plant at Natanz with
technology for gas centrifuge enrichment from Pakistan (Khan Research
Laboratories), a country that has received nuclear cooperation from China.  Also, the
IAEA found out in 2003 that, in 1991, China supplied Iran with 1.8 metric tons of
natural uranium, reported Nucleonics Week (June 12, 2003).  The head of the Iranian
Atomic Organization reported an Iranian-PRC contract to extract uranium ore in
Yazd.13  The DCI’s report issued in November 2004 confirmed that the Iranian
opposition group, “beginning in August of 2002, revealed several previously
undisclosed Iranian nuclear facilities.”
In testimony to Congress on February 11, 2003, DCI George Tenet pointed to
China’s “firms” (rather than the government) and warned that they “may be backing
away from Beijing’s 1997 bilateral commitment to forego any new nuclear
cooperation with Iran.”  The DCI reported in November  2003 that “some interactions
of concern” between PRC and Iranian entities continued in the first half of 2003.  The
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, testified
to the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 24, 2004, that PRC entities
“remain involved with nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and Iran, while, “in
some cases,” the entities are involved without the PRC government’s knowledge.
In April 2004, the Administration imposed sanctions under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act.  Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf testified to the House
International Relations Committee on May 18, 2004, that “most” of the sanctions
related to non-nuclear transfers, but there were concerns in the nuclear area as well.
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In May 2006, diplomatic sources revealed that Iran had used uranium
hexafluoride gas (UF6) from China to accelerate Iran’s uranium enrichment program.
An Iranian news agency acknowledged that hexafluoride from China was used in
initial uranium enrichment, after which domestic supplies were applied.14
Referral to U.N. Security Council.  The United States has a concern over
how China could use its voting power at the IAEA and U.N. to oppose the U.S.
objective of having the IAEA refer Iran’s case to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC)
for a response to Iran’s alleged violation of the NPT.  While it might share U.S.
concerns about nuclear nonproliferation, China opposes sanctions, doubts the
credibility of U.S. intelligence, and has priorities that include energy deals with Iran
to fuel continued rapid economic growth to contain social unrest.  Beijing also has
interests in raising its leverage vis-a-vis Washington.  Still, the impasse, despite high-
level U.S. urging, increases the burden on China’s diplomacy to produce results.
On October 28, 2004, China and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding
for a deal in oil and gas sales worth $70 billion.  Then, China’s Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing talked with Secretary of State Powell on November 5, 2004, saying that the
case should remain under the IAEA. On the next day, Li arrived in Tehran and
expressed opposition to referral of Iran’s case to the UNSC.  Upon returning to
Beijing on November 8, Li insisted on the phone to U.S. National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice that Iran’s case be solved under the IAEA.15  At a meeting on the
sideline of a U.N. summit in New York on September 13, 2005, President Bush tried
to persuade PRC ruler Hu Jintao not to block the IAEA from referring Iran’s case to
the UNSC.  Before the meeting, the Administration briefed China on U.S. classified
intelligence about Iran’s development of the Shahab-3 missile that could deliver a
nuclear warhead.  China (and others) abstained when the IAEA passed a resolution
on September 24, 2005, declaring that Iran is not complying with the NPT, and the
PRC envoy in Vienna continued to call for dealing with Iran at the IAEA.16  President
Bush said that he had to repeat to Hu Jintao in a meeting in Beijing in November
2005 the need to cooperate to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.17
On January 18, 2006, China signed another energy agreement with Iran, valued
at $33 million, to maintain an oil drilling platform in the Caspian Sea for three years.
This deal followed an escalation of the situation on January 10, when Iran resumed
work on uranium enrichment, after allowing IAEA inspectors to place seals on
equipment at an enrichment plant at Natanz and starting negotiations with Britain,
France, and Germany two years before.  Also, Russian President Vladimir Putin had
proposed in November 2005 that a Russian facility handle any enrichment for Iran.
If Russia joined other Western countries in pressuring Iran, a more isolated China
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would see its position weakened and join the U.S. and European consensus.  If
Russia does not, China can more easily hide behind Russian objections.
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick visited Beijing January 24-25, 2006,
to stress the importance of the Iran issue, continue the “senior dialogue” over the
PRC’s role as a “responsible stakeholder,” and discussed a summit (albeit not a state
visit) on April 20 between PRC leader Hu Jintao and President Bush in Washington.
At a news conference in Beijing on January 24, Zoellick cited common concerns over
Iran but indicated continuing differences over “diplomatic tactics.”  Right afterwards,
Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani visited Beijing and
indicated consideration of a role for China in the Russian proposal on uranium
enrichment.  Indeed, on January 26, the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman supported
the Russian idea as “useful” while saying China has not received an “official” Iranian
proposal.  He continued to state China’s opposition to sanctions and support for
“rights” to peaceful nuclear energy under the NPT.  At a special meeting among
China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States in London on
January 30, they stated agreement to “report” (rather than “refer”) Iran’s case to the
UNSC at the special IAEA meeting in early February but to wait until March to
decide at the Security Council on any actions to support the IAEA (without
mentioning sanctions).  Nevertheless, a senior U.S. official said that this was “the
most powerful message we could have hoped for.”18  On February 4, China was one
of 27 countries that voted at the IAEA to support a resolution to report Iran to the
UNSC, showing some progress in China’s cooperation since it voted to abstain on
a resolution on Iran in September 2005.
Amidst this diplomacy, China and Iran have worked to complete negotiations
on the oil and gas deal for which the memorandum of understanding was signed in
October 2004.  In February 2006, this deal was valued at up to $100 billion.19  (In
January-February 2006, Iran was the third largest supplier of oil to China, after
Angola and Saudi Arabia, providing 390,000 barrels/day, or 13% of total imports.)
One question is whether any international sanctions on Iran would cover oil exports.
When the IAEA sent its February 27 report on Iran to the Security Council on
March 8, 2006, saying that it could not conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear
materials or activities in Iran, China continued to be less critical of Iran and to favor
the handling of this issue at the IAEA rather than the Security Council.  After weeks
of negotiations, the President of the Security Council issued a statement on March
29, 2006, calling on Iran to suspend all nuclear enrichment and reprocessing
activities to be verified by the IAEA, and requesting an IAEA report in 30 days to the
IAEA Board of Governors “and in parallel” to the Security Council, with no mention
of sanctions or use of force.  The Administration called for a UNSC resolution that
invokes Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (for sanctions or force), but the PRC argued
against such action despite the IAEA’s April 28 report on Iran’s non-compliance.
On May 31, 2006, Secretary of State Rice announced U.S. support for a new
approach to offer a package of incentives and costs for Iran’s compliance, agreed by
CRS-13
China and others on June 1.  However to U.S. displeasure, on June 16, the PRC
hosted a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), at which Iran
attended as an observer.  PRC President Hu Jintao balanced his remarks to Iranian
President Ahmadinejad by saying that Iran has a right to nuclear energy and calling
for its response to the offer.  But with no Iranian response, on July 12, China and the
other five countries issued a statement agreeing to a two-stage approach: to seek a
UNSC resolution to make it mandatory for Iran to suspend nuclear enrichment as
required by the IAEA; and if Iran refuses, to adopt measures under Article 41 (for
sanctions) of Chapter VII.  But China is unlikely to support use of Chapter VII, and
its official media did not report the second step of the agreed approach.
After Iran announced that it would respond on August 22, 2006, China voted on
July 31 with other members of the UNSC (only Qatar opposed) for Resolution 1696,
demanding that Iran suspend nuclear enrichment; calling upon countries to prevent
technology transfers to Iran’s nuclear enrichment and missile programs; requesting
an IAEA report on Iran’s compliance by August 31; and warning of sanctions if Iran
does not comply.  But China stressed that sanctions would require further decisions
and called for using diplomatic negotiations and focusing on the IAEA.
(On U.S. policy towards Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and
Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Missile Technology Sales to Iran
Ballistic Missiles.  The CIA found that China delivered dozens or perhaps
hundreds of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools to Iran
sometime between mid-1994 and mid-1995, reported the International Herald
Tribune (June 23, 1995).  The November 21, 1996 Washington Times cited a CIA
report as saying that China agreed in August 1996 to sell to Iran’s Defense Industries
Organization gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment, which could be used
to build and test components for missile guidance.  On the same day, the State
Department would only say publicly that “we believe at this stage that, in fact, the
Chinese are operating within the assurances they have given us.”
The Washington Times (September 10, 1997) cited Israeli and U.S. intelligence
sources as saying that China Great Wall Industry Corp. (which markets satellite
launches) was providing telemetry equipment used in flight-tests to Iran for its
development of the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 MRBMs (with ranges, respectively, of
about 800 mi. and 1,250 mi.).  Over 100 PRC and North Korean experts worked
there, reported the Washington Times (November 23, 1997) and Washington Post
(December 31, 1997).  Citing a May 27, 1998 intelligence report, the June 16, 1998
Washington Times reported that, in May 1998, China discussed selling telemetry
equipment (for testing missiles) to Iran.  On July 22, 1998, Iran first tested the mobile
Shahab-3 missile, which the Pentagon, on the next day, confirmed to be based on a
North Korean Nodong MRBM.  In Beijing in November 1998, Acting
Undersecretary of State John Holum protested continuing PRC missile technology
aid to Iran, including a reported shipment of telemetry equipment in November 1998,
according to the Washington Post (November 13, 1998) and Washington Times
(December 7, 1998).  U.S. intelligence suspected continued PRC sales of missile
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technology to Iran in 1999, including specialty steel, telemetry equipment, and
training on inertial guidance, reported the Washington Times (April 15, 1999).
On November 21, 2000, under the AECA and EAA, the Clinton Administration
announced it determined that PRC entities had transferred Category II items (missile
components) to Iranian entities and U.S. sanctions would be waived on China given
its new missile nonproliferation promise.  
Still, the Washington Times (January 26, 2001) said that NORINCO (a PRC
defense industrial conglomerate) shipped specialty metals and chemicals used in
missile production to Iran.  On the national emergency regarding weapons
proliferation, President Bush continued to report to Congress in June 2002 that PRC
(and North Korean and Russian) entities “have continued to supply Iran with a wide
variety of missile-related goods, technology, and expertise.”20  The report confirmed
that the May 2002 sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-
178) were imposed on three PRC entities for conventional transfers to Iran related to
unspecified missiles.  It also noted that the Administration did not impose new
missile proliferation sanctions (under the AECA and EAA) between November 2001
and May 2002.  (The Iran Nonproliferation Act authorizes sanctions on a foreign
person based on “credible information” of a transfer to Iran (not necessarily a
weapons program) of technology controlled by multilateral nonproliferation regimes.
The AECA and EAA require sanctions based on a Presidential determination that a
foreign entity “knowingly” transferred any MTCR missile equipment or technology
to a program for an MTCR Category I missile.)  
On May 23, 2003, the Administration  imposed sanctions on NORINCO and
Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, under Executive Order (E.O.) 12938 (as
amended by E.O. 13094).  According to U.S. officials, the Administration banned
imports from NORINCO for two years (worth over $100 million annually), because
it transferred missile technology to Iran, even after the PRC issued missile technology
export controls in August 2002, that would assist the development of medium- or
long-range ballistic missiles, reported Reuters (May 22) and Wall Street Journal
(May 23, 2003).  (E.O. 12938 requires sanctions if the Secretary of State determines
that a foreign person has “materially contributed or attempted to contribute
materially” to WMD or missile proliferation.)  
Again on June 26, 2003, the Administration imposed sanctions under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act on five PRC entities (including NORINCO) and one North
Korean entity.  The State Department noted that it added in the Act’s required report
to Congress (a classified report was submitted on June 25) transfers of items that
have the potential to make a “material contribution” to WMD, cruise missiles, or
ballistic missiles, even if the items fall below the parameters of multilateral export
control lists.  The DCI reported in November 2004 that, in the second half of 2003,
PRC (and former Soviet and North Korean) entities continued to supply ballistic
CRS-15
21 John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
“Coordinated Allied Approaches to China,” Tokyo, Japan, February 7, 2005.
22 Bill Gertz, “U.S. Puts Sanctions on Chinese Firms for Aiding Tehran,” Washington Times,
December 27, 2005.
missile-related equipment, technology, and expertise to Iran, which is pursuing
longer-range missiles.  The report also said that PRC entities provided missile-related
assistance to Iran that helped it to advance toward its goal of self-sufficient
production of ballistic missiles.  
On April 1, 2004, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act based on “credible information” that five PRC entities (along
with other foreign entities) transferred unspecified prohibited items to Iran.  Assistant
Secretary of State John Wolf testified to the House International Relations
Committee on May 18, 2004, that “most” of the sanctions related to non-nuclear
transfers, but there were concerns in the nuclear area as well.  The Washington Times
reported on August 23, 2004, that the U.S. government detected several weeks before
that a PRC company supplied missile technology to Iran within the past six months.
On September 20, 2004, under E.O. 12938 (amended by E.O. 13094), the State
Department imposed sanctions on Xinshidai (New Era Company), a defense-
industrial conglomerate, for material contributions to missile technology proliferation
in a publicly unnamed country.  The Bush Administration again imposed sanctions
on PRC entities under the Iran Nonproliferation Act, in September, November, and
December 2004.  Under Secretary of State John Bolton reported in a speech in Tokyo
in February 2005 that the PRC government still had not taken action to stop
NORINCO’s missile proliferation activities in Iran, despite repeated sanctions on this
“serial proliferator” costing NORINCO hundreds of millions of dollars in banned
exports to the United States.21  On December 23, 2005, the Administration again
imposed sanctions for missile and chemical weapon (CW)-related proliferation in
Iran by NORINCO and five other PRC entities, although the State Department
reportedly had considered the sanctions since April 2005.22  New sanctions were
imposed on previously sanctioned PRC entities on June 13, 2006.  (See Table 1.)
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles.  China sold land-, sea-, and air-launched anti-
ship missiles to Iran, raising policy issues about imposing sanctions.  In January
1996, Vice Admiral John Scott Redd, as Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, first
reported that China supplied to Iran C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles, as disclosed in
the Washington Times (March 27, 1996).  In 1997, General J.H. Binford Peay,
Central Command commander, said that China transferred 20 patrol boats with 15
equipped with C-802 missiles, reported the Washington Times (January 29, 1997).
The C-802 is a subsonic (0.9 Mach) missile which has a range of 120 km. (75
mi.) and carries a 165 kg. (363 lb.) warhead.  No international agreement bans
transfers of anti-ship missiles, and the C-802 is not covered by the MTCR, which
controls exports of ballistic and cruise missiles that can deliver 500 kg. warheads to
300 km.  Nevertheless, some argued that the transfer violated the Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act of 1992, which requires sanctions for transfers that contribute
to Iranian or Iraqi efforts to acquire “destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
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conventional weapons” (including cruise missiles) or WMD.  On April 10, 1997,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn testified that
“especially troubling to us is that these cruise missiles pose new, direct threats to
deployed U.S. forces.”  Still, Einhorn contended that “the C-802 transfers that have
occurred so far are not of a destabilizing number and type.”  Arguments against
sanctions were in part based on the case that anti-ship cruise missiles were not a new
type of weapon in Iran’s arsenal; China previously transferred Silkworm anti-ship
cruise missiles to Iran.  Others in Congress and the Pentagon argued that U.S.
sanctions should be imposed on China for the delivery of C-802 anti-ship cruise
missiles to Iran, because they were “destabilizing” to the region.
According to Reuters, on June 17, 1997, Defense Secretary Cohen reported Iran
had test-fired PRC air-launched, anti-ship cruise missiles.  They were C-801 missiles
fired from F-4 fighters.  China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation
(CPMIEC) markets air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles called C-801K and
C-802K.  The subsonic C-801K has a range of 50 km (31 mi).  Cohen added that the
U.S. military was watching very closely and has “the capability to defeat any weapon
system that Iran might possess.”  After seeking to clarify apparently vague PRC
assurances made at the U.S.-China summit in October 1997, Defense Secretary
Cohen said in Beijing on January 20, 1998, that the PRC President promised that
China does not plan to transfer to Iran additional anti-ship cruise missiles, including
those under contract, or technology to achieve over-the-horizon capability or
indigenous production, reported Reuters (January 20, 1998).  During another visit to
China, Secretary Cohen said on July 10, 2000, that the PRC has “abided by that
agreement” made in 1998 “as far as the shipment of cruise missiles to the Iranians.”
In his January 2001 report on proliferation, Cohen did not mention China’s promises
on Iranian cruise missiles.
U.S. intelligence reportedly believed that China already delivered perhaps 150
C-802 missiles to Iran, which then made additional C-802s using suspected French
TRI-60 engines manufactured and sold by Microturbo SA to China beginning in 1987
and perhaps also to Iran in 1998, reported the Washington Post (April 3, 1999).
Responding to U.S. diplomatic protests, Paris said that the French firm sold
generators, not missile engines.  The DCI reported in July 1999 that “China also was
an important supplier of [advanced conventional munitions] to Iran through the
second half of 1998, but President Jiang Zemin pledged to cease supply of cruise
missiles” [in January 1998].  The report did not say whether that pledge was holding.
The Washington Times (August 19, 1999) cited intelligence reports as saying that
China signed an $11 million agreement to improve Iran’s FL-10 anti-ship cruise
missiles.  The DCI’s August 2000 report, on the second half of 1999, said that China
(and others) helped Iran to develop its capability to produce conventional weapons,
including PRC-designed anti-ship cruise missiles.
On May 9, 2002, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on eight PRC
entities, under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, for unspecified transfers.  The
Washington Times (May 17 and July 26, 2002) reported that Iran had  acquired PRC
patrol boats armed with anti-ship cruise missiles.  Also, the Washington Times
alleged on May 20, 2002, that three of the sanctioned PRC entities had transferred
cruise missile components to Iran.  These entities were reported to be: China
Shipbuilding Trading Co., CPMIEC, and China National Aero-Technology Import
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and Export Corp., and they allegedly helped Iran to develop a new ground-launched
anti-ship cruise missile with a range of about 310 miles.  In June 2002, the
President’s report on weapons proliferation confirmed that three of the PRC entities
sanctioned in May had engaged in “conventional weapons-related cooperation with
Iran,” but it did not specify whether the entities engaged in the proliferation of
ballistic and/or cruise missiles.23
On July 9, 2002, the Administration again imposed sanctions on China
Shipbuilding Trading Co., this time under the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act
of 1992 (P.L. 102-484) (in addition to eight PRC entities sanctioned for chemical
weapons proliferation in Iran).  It was the first use of this law.  The sanctions on
China Shipbuilding appeared to be for “knowingly and materially” contributing to
the proliferation of destabilizing numbers and types of cruise missiles in Iran.  The
Administration did not apply sanctions to the PRC government.
The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) was
collaborating with Iran to produce C-701 and C-801 anti-ship cruise missiles,
reported Jane’s Defense Weekly (December 4, 2002).  CASC is an aerospace defense-
industrial corporation under the PRC’s State Council.
Chemical Sales to Iran
Concerning chemical weapons, the Washington Post of March 8, 1996, reported
that U.S. intelligence, for over one year, was monitoring transfers of precursor
chemicals and chemical-related equipment from China to Iranian organizations
affiliated with the military or the Revolutionary Guards.  According to the report, the
equipment included glass-lined vessels for mixing the caustic precursors and special
air filtration equipment to prevent poison gas leaks.  Iran was also reportedly buying
PRC technology for indigenous and independent production.
Confirming long-suspected PRC transfers, on May 21, 1997, the Clinton
Administration imposed sanctions on two PRC companies, five PRC citizens, and
a Hong Kong company for transfers to Iran contributing to chemical weapon
proliferation.  U.S. sanctions, banning U.S. government procurement and imports,
were imposed under the AECA and EAA, as amended by the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-182).
However, the Administration did not impose sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (affecting “persons” or “countries”), because the
transfers apparently occurred before February 10, 1996, the date when provisions on
WMD proliferation took effect, as amended by the FY1996 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 104-106).   Also, the State Department said that it had no
evidence that the PRC or Hong Kong governments were involved.
An intelligence report was said to allege that China completed in June 1997 a
plant in Iran for making glass-lined equipment used in producing chemical weapons,
reported the Washington Times (October 30, 1997).  The Nanjing Chemical and
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Industrial Group built the factory, and North Chemical Industries Corporation
(NOCINCO) brokered the deal.  (NOCINCO is affiliated with NORINCO, a defense-
industrial firm.)  However, the PRC government reportedly held up supplies of raw
materials.  The London Daily Telegraph (May 24, 1998) reported that SinoChem
Corp.’s branch in Tianjin, China, supplied to Iran 500 tons of phosphorus
pentasulphide (controlled by the AG for making nerve agents).
On June 14, 2001, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 on Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import
and Export Corporation (one of the two PRC companies sanctioned in 1997) for
proliferation of chemical weapons-related materials or equipment to Iran.  According
to the Washington Times (June 28, 2001), the PRC company helped Iran to build a
factory to manufacture dual-use equipment applicable to chemical weapons.  Again,
on January 16, 2002, the Administration imposed similar sanctions (for transfers of
chemical and/or biological items controlled by the Australia Group) on Liyang
Chemical Equipment Company, China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import
and Export Company, and a PRC citizen (Chen Qingchang, or Q.C. Chen).  Chen
was also sanctioned in 1997.  Sanctions were imposed for two years, but there was
no economic effect because of the absence of U.S. government contracts, assistance,
arms sales, or dual-use exports with/to such “persons.”
With those actions, the State Department did not impose sanctions under the
AECA, EAA, or the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, apparently because unlike
those laws, the Iran Nonproliferation Act requires semi-annual reports to Congress
and authorizes sanctions based on “credible information” that a person, since 1999,
transferred to Iran items controlled by multilateral export control lists (NSG, MTCR,
AG, CWC, or Wassenaar Arrangement).  The Administration again imposed
sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act on May 9, 2002, and a Presidential
report to Congress in June 2002 confirmed that five of the eight PRC entities were
sanctioned for transferring AG-controlled items to Iran.24 The Washington Times
(May 20, 2002) said that the transfers involved anti-corrosive glass-lined equipment
to make chemical weapons and that NORINCO was sanctioned but not listed among
the eight publicly named PRC entities.
On July 9, 2002, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions under the Iran-Iraq
Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (in the first use of this law), as well as the AECA
and EAA (as amended by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991), on eight PRC entities (including those previously
sanctioned) for “knowingly and materially” contributing to Iran’s chemical weapons
program, according to the State Department.  The Administration did not impose
sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Act on the PRC government.  The Washington Times
(July 19, 2002) reported that the transfers took place between September 2000 and
October 2001.  
The DCI’s November 2004 report said that, in the second half of 2003, “PRC
firms” still provided dual-use production equipment and technology related to
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chemical weapons to Iran, despite sanctions.  On November 24, 2004, the Bush
Administration again imposed sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act that
affected four PRC entities, including Q.C. Chen, likely related to chemical weapons.
On December 23, 2005, the Administration again imposed sanctions for missile and
chemical weapon (CW)-related proliferation in Iran by NORINCO and five other
PRC entities, although the State Department reportedly had considered the sanctions
since April 2005.25  (See Table 1 for a full list of sanctioned entities.)
North Korea’s Missile and Nuclear Weapons Programs
Suspected Missile Supplies.  Since 1998, there have been public reports
about and U.S. government confirmation of PRC assistance to North Korea’s missile
program.  There are questions about whether the PRC has interests in North Korea’s
missile advances.  Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, a Deputy Chief of General
Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), visited North Korea in early August
1998, just before the surprising launch of a medium-range Taepo Dong-1 missile on
August 31, 1998.  However, increased worries about North Korea’s missile program
spurred U.S. and Japanese support for missile defenses opposed by China.  Some say
PRC entities acted on their own.
The National Security Agency (NSA) reportedly suspected in late 1998 that the
China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) was working with North
Korea on its space program (closely related to missiles) to develop satellites, but that
cooperation was not confirmed to be linked to the Taepo Dong-1 MRBM program,
said the Washington Times (February 23, 1999).  An NSA report dated March 8,
1999, suggested that China sold specialty steel for use in North Korea’s missile
program, reported the Washington Times (April 15, 1999).  In June 1999, U.S.
intelligence reportedly found that PRC entities transferred accelerometers,
gyroscopes, and precision grinding machinery to North Korea, according to the
Washington Times (July 20, 1999).  An October 20, 1999 classified report was said
to say that China’s Changda Corp. sought to buy Russian gyroscopes that were more
of the same that China supplied to the North Korean missile program earlier that
year, reported the Washington Times (November 19, 1999).  In December 1999, the
NSA discovered an alleged PRC deal to supply unspecified PRC-made missile-
related items to North Korea through a Hong Kong company, said the Washington
Times (January 1, 2000). 
The DCI first publicly confirmed PRC supplies to North Korea in July 1999.
The DCI’s April 2003 report said that, in the first half of 2002, North Korea
continued to procure missile-related raw materials and components from foreign
sources, but it dropped a previous reference about those foreign supplies as especially
going through North Korean firms in China.  There are direct implications for U.S.
national security, because of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and nuclear programs
as well as delivery systems.  PRC technology transfers have further implications for
secondary, or retransferred, proliferation, since North Korea reportedly has supplied
technology to Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. 
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Secret Nuclear Programs.  A serious case of such secondary proliferation
involves North Korea’s secret program to enrich uranium to develop nuclear
weapons, a program surprisingly acknowledged by North Korea to visiting Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly during talks in Pyongyang on October 4, 2002, but not
publicly disclosed by the Bush Administration until October 16, 2002, at a time when
President Bush sought congressional authorization for the war against Iraq.
The DCI’s April 2003 report stated that the United States was suspicious of an
uranium enrichment program in North Korea for “several years” but did not obtain
“clear evidence indicating that North Korea had begun constructing a centrifuge
facility until recently.”  While the DCI previously reported that North Korea has
another program using plutonium that produced one or two nuclear weapons, the
Washington Post reported on April 28, 2004, that U.S. intelligence newly estimated
that North Korea has at least eight nuclear weapons.  (Also see CRS Issue Brief
IB91141, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry Niksch.)
DCI George Tenet testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee on February
24, 2004, that U.S. intelligence judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had
produced “one, possibly two, nuclear weapons” and the 8,000 fuel rods that North
Korea claims to have reprocessed into plutonium metal would provide enough
plutonium for “several more.”  On February 16, 2005, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, testified that North Korea’s Taepo
Dong 2 intercontinental ballistic missile, which might be ready for testing, “could
deliver a nuclear warhead to parts of the United States in a two-stage variant and
target all of North America with a three-stage variant.”
This case raises a question about whether China’s nuclear technology has
indirectly contributed to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program through Pakistan,
since China was the “principal supplier” to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
There are also questions about China’s knowledge about the Pakistani-North Korean
trade and whether Beijing has shared useful intelligence with the United States.
The New York Times and Washington Post reported on October 18, 2002, that
U.S. officials believed Pakistan provided equipment, including gas centrifuges, for
the North Korean uranium enrichment program, in return for North Korea’s supply
of Nodong MRBMs to Pakistan by 1998.  Another Washington Post report added on
November 13, 2002, that the Bush Administration had knowledge that Pakistan
continued to provide nuclear technology to North Korea through the summer of 2002.
Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center wrote in National
Review Online (November 19, 2002) that “one might call on Pakistan, Russia, and
China to detail what nuclear technology and hardware they allowed North Korea to
import.”  John Tkacik of the Heritage Foundation wrote in the Asian Wall Street
Journal (December 2, 2002) that most in the U.S. intelligence community doubt
China was “completely in the dark,” as PRC President Jiang Zemin claimed at his
summit with President Bush at Crawford, TX, on October 25, 2002.
The New York Times reported on January 4, 2004, about a history of nuclear
technology proliferating from Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratories headed by
Abdul Qadeer Khan and disclosed that he had transferred designs for uranium-
enrichment centrifuges to China first.  DCI George Tenet publicly testified to the
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Senate Intelligence Committee on February 24, 2004, that North Korea has pursued
a “production-scale uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by
A.Q. Khan.”  Particularly troubling has been the reported intelligence finding in early
2004 that Khan sold Libya a nuclear bomb design that he received from China in the
early 1980s (in return for giving China centrifuge technology), a design that China
had already tested in 1966 and had developed as a compact nuclear bomb for delivery
on a missile.26  That finding raised an additional question of whether Khan also sold
that bomb design to others, including Iran and North Korea.
Moreover, there might be PRC firms directly or indirectly involved in North
Korea’s nuclear weapons programs or weapons proliferation to other countries.  In
June 1999, authorities in India inspected the North Korean freighter Kuwolsan and
found an assembly line for Scud ballistic missiles intended for Libya, including many
parts and machines from China or Japan, according to the Washington Post (August
14, 2003).  The Washington Times reported on December 9 and 17, 2002, that a PRC
company in the northeastern coastal city of Dalian sold to North Korea 20 tons of
tributyl phosphate (TBP), a dual-use chemical that U.S. intelligence reportedly
believed would be used in the North Korean nuclear weapons program.
PRC Ports and Airspace.  There are also questions about China’s role in
allowing Pakistani, North Korean, and Iranian ships and planes to use PRC ports and
airspace (and perhaps military airfields).  China’s possible cooperation in
interdiction, restrictions in the use of its ports and airfields, law-enforcement, and
intelligence-sharing has become a salient question in light of the Bush
Administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced in May 2003
(which China did not join).  As part of the military trade between Pakistan and North
Korea, in July 2002, Pakistan flew a C-130 transport aircraft to pick up missile parts
in North Korea, reported the New York Times (November 24, 2002).  In December
2002, the Spanish and U.S. navies interdicted a North Korean ship (So San) with
Scud missiles bound for Yemen, and the Spanish Defense Minister reported that the
ship’s last port of call was in China.  In addition, an Iranian ship stopped at the
Tianjin port in China and picked up missile components before sailing on to North
Korea to take delivery of missiles and rocket fuel in February and November 2002,
reported the South Korean newspaper, Joong Ang Ilbo (December 19, 2002).  From
April to July 2003, China reportedly gave overflight rights to Iranian Il-76 cargo
planes that flew to North Korea at least six times to pick up wooden crates suspected
of containing cruise missiles, and the Bush Administration lodged a diplomatic
protest with Beijing, reported Time (Asian edition) on July 14, 2003.  At a hearing
held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 11, 2003, on U.S.-
China relations, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confirmed to Senator
Russell Feingold that the State Department raised with China the issue of North
Korean planes flying through PRC airspace or making refueling stops in China.  In
June 2005, China (and a Central Asian country) agreed to deny over-flight rights to
an Iranian cargo plane that had landed in North Korea to allegedly pick up missile
components, according to the New York Times (October 24, 2005).
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Military Relations.  A question arose about the PRC’s military relationship
with the DPRK, which has not strengthened during this crisis.  In mid-August 2003,
Wen Wei Po (a PRC-owned newspaper in Hong Kong) published an article
questioning whether the PRC-North Korean alliance under the 1961 Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance continued to serve China’s interest.
China took steps that appeared to pressure North Korea, including using the PLA.
In early September 2003, China replaced paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP)
troops with PLA soldiers along its border with North Korea, as confirmed by the
PRC Foreign Ministry and the official People’s Daily (September 16, 2003),
apparently to warn North Korea against provocations to raise tensions.  The Defense
Department’s 2004 report to Congress on PRC military power skeptically critiqued
that China “has avoided taking real steps to pressure North Korea.”  Nonetheless, the
report confirmed that “as a potential hedge against uncertainty, the PLA assumed
responsibility for border security along the northeast frontier in fall 2003, increasing
security along the porous border with North Korea and strengthening China’s ability
to stem refugee flows or respond to a breakdown of the North Korean regime.”27
However, PRC-DPRK military ties could strengthen against Japan.
A key question has been about the PLA’s knowledge of the DPRK’s missile
program.  As discussed elsewhere in this report, the PRC and DPRK militaries had
high-level contact just before both the missile tests of August 1998 and July 2006.
The PLA has denied information about and leverage over those tests.
China has balanced its traditional military friendship with North Korea with
resumption of high-level military contacts with the United States in October 2005,
when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Beijing.  When PRC ruler Hu
Jintao visited Pyongyang in October 2005 and Kim Jong-il visited China in January
2006, Hu’s third position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission was
downplayed by PRC press.  On March 9, 2006, General B.B. Bell, Commander of
U.S. Forces Korea, testified to the House Armed Services Committee that PRC-
North Korean military engagement is “quite low” and that despite the friendship
treaty, “the amount of military support that the PRC provides to the North is
minimal.”  The PLA sought to downplay the May 2006 visit of Admiral William
Fallon, Commander of the Pacific Command, to the Shenyang Military Region (close
to the border with North Korea).  During the top PLA commander, General Guo
Boxiong’s, visit to Washington in mid-July 2006, General Guo criticized North
Korea’s July 4 missile tests, citing the UNSC’s Resolution that condemned the tests.
(See CRS Report RL32496, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, by
Shirley Kan.)
Trilateral and Six-Party Talks in Beijing.  Since the Bush
Administration’s October 2002 disclosure about North Korea’s ongoing nuclear
weapons programs, it has sought a multilateral effort (not just bilateral negotiations)
to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) (not just
a freeze) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs (uranium and plutonium
programs) as well as nuclear weapons.  The Administration’s strategy has relied on
securing China’s cooperation.  At the October 25, 2002 summit in Crawford, TX, top
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PRC ruler Jiang Zemin agreed with Bush on the goal of a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula achieved through a peaceful resolution, although Jiang claimed to be
“completely in the dark” about North Korea’s nuclear weapons.
However, some have questioned whether China has been helpful in using its
leverage with North Korea and whether its role warrants strengthening the U.S.-PRC
relationship.  China has its own concerns that include: (1) U.S. security policies
(suspected of provoking a collapse of the North Korean regime, conflicts, and costs
to a perceived buffer between China and U.S. forces); (2) diminished international
standing in any appearances of isolated PRC influence; (3) questions about whether
Beijing’s support for Washington would result — directly or indirectly — in limits
to U.S. support for Taiwan, including arms sales; (4) U.S. alliances with Japan and
South Korea; and (5) a stronger Japan (with missile defense and other capabilities).
North Korea further escalated the situation by expelling IAEA inspectors and
reactivating its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in December 2002, and by withdrawing
from the NPT in January 2003.  On February 7, 2003, Bush said he had to “remind”
Jiang of “joint responsibilities” in achieving common objectives concerning North
Korea.  Two days later, Secretary of State Colin Powell said in an interview on Fox
News Sunday that China has “considerable influence with North Korea.”  Powell
reported that North Korea depends on China for 80 percent of its energy and
economic activity, and urged China to play an active role in the dispute.  While in
Beijing on February 24, 2003, Secretary Powell noted that “the United States and
China share the goal of a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to this problem.  It
cannot simply be treated, however, as a bilateral matter between the United States
and North Korea.”28  Later, in November, Powell disclosed that after he had pressed
the need for China to “rise to its responsibilities in dealing with this regional
problem,” PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen made an “important contribution” in
March 2003 by flying to North Korea and delivering the message that “there would
be no alternative to multilateral talks in which all countries of the region would be
fully involved, China included.”29
Trilateral Talks (April 2003).  Thus, on April 23-25, 2003, China hosted the
Trilateral Talks among China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),
and the United States.  Secretary Powell noted positively that “China has stepped
up.”  However, the DCI’s report issued in November 2004 confirmed that, at the
meeting, North Korea threatened to “transfer” or “demonstrate” its nuclear weapons.
On June 9, 2003, in Tokyo, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage “saluted”
China’s cooperation on the problem of North Korea and declared “a new phase of our
relationship with China.”  In mid-July 2003, PRC President Hu Jintao dispatched
Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo to Pyongyang with a letter for Kim Jong-Il that
proposed a multilateral meeting with U.S.-North Korean talks on the sidelines,
reported the New York Times (July 16, 2003).  
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1st Six-Party Talks (August 2003).  Responding to U.S. insistence on
expanded multilateral talks, China hosted the first round of the Six-Party Talks (also
including South Korea, Japan, and Russia) on August 27-29, 2003.  However, North
Korea again threatened to transfer or test a nuclear weapon, as confirmed by the
DCI’s report of November 2004.
China reportedly seized a shipment of tributyl phosphate (TBP), a material used
for nuclear weapons, suspected by the CIA on a train bound for North Korea in the
summer of 2003, reported Asahi Shimbun (February 22, 2004).  The DCI’s report
confirmed that, in September 2003, at the border with North Korea, China stopped
a shipment of chemicals that could have been used in the DPRK’s nuclear program.
2nd Six-Party Talks (February 2004).  The Administration sought another
round of multilateral talks before the end of 2003, with a tentative date set by
November for around December 17,30 but the talks were not held then.  When PRC
Premier Wen Jiabao visited President Bush at the White House on December 9,
2003, the Taiwan question eclipsed the issue of North Korea.  The Washington Post
disclosed on January 7, 2004, that at a meeting in Seoul the week before, a PRC
diplomat, Fu Ying, questioned the credibility of U.S. intelligence that Pyongyang has
a highly enriched uranium program.  
China then hosted the second round of Six-Party Talks on February 25-28, 2004,
for which Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly expressed appreciation.  However,
North Korea reportedly denied the suspected uranium enrichment program.  The
State Department’s statement at the end of the talks did not report any progress in
either freezing or dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, but rather
pointed to “progress on a regularized process” for peacefully resolving this issue.
3rd Six-Party Talks (June 2004).  Before China hosted another round of Six-
Party Talks, PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong publicly questioned the
credibility of U.S. intelligence about North Korea’s uranium enrichment program and
expressed support for North Korea’s arguments (in an interview with the New York
Times, June 9, 2004). China hosted the third round of Six-Party Talks on June 23-26,
2004.  The DPRK again threatened to test a nuclear weapon.  Afterward, National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice traveled to Beijing and told Central Military
Commission (CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin and President Hu Jintao that “A.Q. Khan
was not engaged in academic research” and that “North Korea has a highly enriched
uranium program,” reported the Washington Times on July 14, 2004.  Also visiting
Beijing in July 2004, North Korea’s National Defense Commission Member and
Defense Minister Kim Il-chol met with CMC Vice Chairman and Defense Minister
Cao Gangchuan and probably discussed PLA provision of aid.
Despite the lack of any breakthrough in the Trilateral Talks and three rounds of
Six-Party Talks held since April 2003, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly
contended at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 2004 that
the multilateral diplomacy has been useful and the talks held in Beijing have yielded
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progress in dealing with the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons.31  In answer to
Senator Chuck Hagel, Kelly acknowledged that “there could be and probably should
be a role for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),” but reported that China
likely will not be interested in dealing with the threat at the UNSC. In answer to
Senator Lincoln Chaffee, Kelly also denied that China has linked its cooperation on
North Korea to U.S. concessions on Taiwan (including arms sales), by saying that
China has not posed Taiwan “as a tactical issue” in discussions about North Korea.
Kelly also acknowledged to Senator Bill Nelson that it remained unclear as to
whether China’s preference for positive incentives (over pressure) will work.  
The six countries had agreed to convene a fourth round of talks by the end of
September 2004, but that time period passed without another such meeting.  As
indicated in his press conference in Beijing on October 25, 2004, Secretary of State
Powell continued to count on China’s “considerable influence with North Korea.”
In early February 2005, President Bush sent Michael Green, the National
Security Council’s Senior Director for Asian Affairs to Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul to
intensify diplomatic pressure on Pyongyang.  In Beijing, Green met with President
Hu Jintao and presented urgent U.S. intelligence findings that North Korea had
processed several tons of uranium hexafluoride (which could be enriched to make
nuclear bombs) and sold some to Libya perhaps in early 2003.32  Other reports,
however, pointed to intelligence findings that the material originated in North Korea
but that Pakistan bought the uranium hexafluoride and supplied it to Libya.33
Suspension of Six-Party Talks.  On February 10, 2005, North Korea again
escalated tensions by announcing that it would indefinitely suspend its participation
in the Six-Party Talks and that it had manufactured nuclear weapons.  North Korea’s
announcement further called into question China’s preference for positive
inducements and raised the issue of using sanctions to pressure Pyongyang, including
consideration of action by the UNSC.  A week after North Korea’s announcement,
South Korea’s ambassador to Beijing  urged China to use its leverage, pointing out
that in addition to economic assistance  (food, fuel, and investments), North Korea
imports 70-80 percent of its foreign goods from China and that China permits several
railways and 15 roads at the North Korean border.34  Instead, China’s Foreign
Ministry contended at a news conference on February 17 that sanctions and pressure
would only complicate and destabilize the situation (a position that Foreign Minister
Li Zhaoxing argued to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on February 12).  China
also pointed to North Korea and the United States as the two key parties to hold talks.
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Wang Jiarui, Director of the International Liaison Department of the Communist
Party of China, visited Pyongyang on February 19-22, 2005, and personally passed
a plea from Hu Jintao to Kim Jong-il about resuming the Six-Party Talks.  At the
same time, to China’s great displeasure, the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State
issued a Joint Statement (“2+2 Statement”) along with the visiting Japanese
Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs that included “the peaceful resolution of
issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” as a common strategic
objective.35  At a press conference on March 6, 2005, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing
characterized China’s role as just “facilitating” the Six-Party Talks.  
The Administration then stepped up pressure on the PRC to use its leverage to
bring North Korea back to the talks.  On March 21, 2005, Secretary of State Rice met
with top PRC officials including President Hu in Beijing, after visiting other Asian
capitals.  She urged China in particular to help restart the Six-Party Talks, publicly
saying that “China has the closest relationship with North Korea,” that “it is not a
U.S.-North Korean issue,” and that “there are other options in the international
system.”36  In Beijing on April 26, 2005, Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill
reportedly raised the idea of an interruption of oil flows from China to North Korea,
but China refused.37  At a news conference on April 28, President Bush reminded
China about his agreement with Jiang Zemin and mentioned Secretary Rice’s option
of going to the U.N. Security Council (where China has veto power).  A PRC Foreign
Ministry official, Yang Xiyu, publicly blamed Washington for a “lack of
cooperation” and Bush for calling Kim Jong-il a “tyrant” at the news conference.38
Chris Hill, at a congressional hearing on May 26, said that China has “enough
influence” to convince North Korea to return to the talks but has not done it.  He also
made China accountable for any failure of the Six-Party Talks if it fails to get its
“very close friend” back to the talks.39  
Meanwhile, Secretary Rice also offered a strengthened U.S.-PRC relationship
and agreed that Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick would hold the first
“Senior Dialogue” with his PRC counterpart, a meeting which was scheduled for
early August 2005.  PRC ruler Hu Jintao had requested what China calls “strategic
talks” when he met with President Bush in November 2004.40  One day after North
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Korea announced on July 9 that it would return to the talks, Secretary Rice visited
China, but this time before visiting U.S. allies (Thailand, Japan, and South Korea).41
4th Six-Party Talks and Joint Statement (July-September 2005).
After a period of 13 months without talks, China announced the start of the fourth
round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing on July 26, 2005, and described China’s role
as both a “host” to “facilitate” the talks and a “participant.” The inconclusive first
phase of this round ended on August 7, 2005, when the countries agreed to recess and
resume talks on August 29.  Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf provided support
for U.S. reports of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, when he said that
A.Q. Khan supplied North Korea with centrifuges and their designs.42  North Korea
did not return to the talks as agreed but returned later on September 13.  Meanwhile,
President Bush agreed to a meeting at the White House with PRC ruler Hu Jintao in
early September but had to postpone it because of Bush’s response to Hurricane
Katrina.  Bush then met with Hu in New York on September 13.
China proposed a joint statement that recognized North Korea’s insistence on
a light water reactor and had no explicit mention of a uranium program.  On
September 17, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo presented China’s draft as
the “most realistic” and put pressure on the United States to agree to it.43  Along with
other countries, the United States agreed to sign the joint statement of principles (not
an agreement) on September 19, 2005, in which North Korea committed to abandon
“all nuclear weapons” and “existing nuclear programs” and to return to the NPT and
IAEA safeguards; and the other countries agreed “to discuss, at an appropriate time,
the subject of the provision of a light water reactor.”  The United States issued a
statement to clarify that dismantlement of nuclear weapons must be verifiable; that
nuclear programs included plutonium and uranium programs; and that an
“appropriate time” for “discussion” of a light water reactor is when North Korea has
verifiably eliminated all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs.44  
At a hearing of the House International Relations Committee on October 6,
2005, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen asked about PRC pressure to accept the
deal.  Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill did not deny that Beijing exerted
pressure and noted that there were earlier PRC drafts that were “absolutely
unacceptable,” while the mention of a light water reactor was “not welcomed.”  He
said publicly, nonetheless, that the United States benefitted from China’s strong
desire to reach a deal and “we can work well with the Chinese.”  He also described
China’s role as that of a “secretariat” (producing drafts), seemingly a neutral role.
CRS-28
45 In a radio interview on July 8, 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that
(continued...)
5th Six-Party Talks (November 2005).  After the joint statement was
signed, PRC Vice Premier Wu Yi traveled to North Korea on October 8-11, 2005,
promising new economic cooperation.  Top PRC leader Hu Jintao then followed with
a visit on October 28-30 and attended a ceremony to sign economic agreements.  On
November 1, China announced that the next round would start on November 9.
While there has been progress in the process, when the meeting for the 5th round of
the Six-Party Talks ended on November 11, no results were announced for the
implementation of the joint statement to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons.
Moreover, there continue to be differences between the U.S. and PRC approaches in
continuing the Six-Party Talks.  While President Bush called for “firm resolve” in a
speech given in Kyoto, Japan, on November 16, 2005, the PRC’s Hu Jintao called for
“greater flexibility” in a speech in Seoul the next day.
PRC Communist Party General-Secretary Hu Jintao hosted North Korean ruler
Kim Jong-il in China on January 10-18, 2006, and Hu expressed support for
continuing the Six-Party Talks.  The PRC then proposed a meeting on January 18 in
Beijing between Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill and North Korean negotiator
Kim Kye-gwan.  China’s media said that PRC diplomat Wu Dawei “also joined” an
implied U.S.-DPRK meeting (vs. the U.S. view of a three-nation meeting).
On February 3, 2006, Senators Harry Reid (Democratic Leader), Carl Levin
(Ranking Democrat of the Armed Services Committee), Joseph Biden (Ranking
Democrat of the Foreign Relations Committee), and John Rockefeller (Vice
Chairman of the Intelligence Committee) wrote a letter to President Bush, saying that
U.S. policy “still has not resulted in an elimination, freeze, or even a slowing of
North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile activities.”  At a hearing of the House
International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on March 8, 2006,
Chairman James Leach critiqued President Bush’s “reactive” approach to the Six-
Party Talks that “appear moribund,” calling for U.S. leadership, “initiative” for more
dialogue, “greater flexibility” for diplomacy, sending Assistant Secretary of State
Chris Hill (the witness) to Pyongyang, negotiation of a permanent peace on the
peninsula at a separate forum, direct contacts with North Koreans, and liaison offices
to solve a “problem of communication.”  Leach argued against continuing to
“transfer the initiative to others, indebting us to the diplomacy of countries that may
have different interests or simply ensconcing the status quo.”
Indeed, despite its considerable influence, China’s role has placed its stance as
more neutral than supportive of the United States and Japan.  As Beijing pursues the
“process” of the talks, results remain elusive.  The burden has increased on China’s
preferred diplomacy to achieve the DPRK’s nuclear disarmament.  The impasse also
has strained U.S.-PRC ties, as Beijing keeps its balanced policy toward Pyongyang.
Missile Firings (July 2006).  The impasse continued into summer 2006,
when China failed to prevent North Korea from test-firing seven ballistic missiles,
including the first test of a Taepo Dong-2 ICBM under development with a range
(perhaps 3,700 miles) that could reach Alaska.45  After the DPRK began preparations
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he said that North Korea has 3-5 more “Taepodong-2 airframes.”
in May, Congress expressed concerns, including in a letter from Senators Carl Levin
and Hillary Rodham Clinton to President Bush on June 15.  At a hearing of the
House Armed Services Committee on June 22, Members asked about China’s role.
Brigadier General John Allen, Principal Director for Asian and Pacific Affairs at the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, testified that the PRC tried to dissuade North
Korea from steps that would be destabilizing and run counter to the Six-Party Talks.
However, the PRC’s use of leverage, including the PLA’s opposition or acquiescence
to the DPRK’s missile program, are uncertain.  Indeed, there was high-level contact
between the militaries of the PRC and DPRK shortly before the July 2006 missile
tests, similar to that before the August 1998 missile firing.  On June 21, 2006, the
PLA Chief of General Staff, General Liang Guanglie, told a DPRK military visitor
in Beijing that the PLA will “expand cooperation” with the Korean People’s Army.
On July 4, 2006 (Washington time), North Korea fired a Taepo Dong-2 ICBM
that failed in less than 40 seconds after launch and several short-range Scuds and
medium-range Nodongs, bringing Washington’s condemnation for this “provocative
act.”  Threatened by the missiles, Japan called for Security Council action.  The
PRC’s less forceful reaction was to express “grave concern” about the “situation” and
to call for “restraint” from all countries.  On July 5, Senator John McCain stated that
China and Russia have the most leverage over North Korea and warned that their
posture will have a heavy impact on our relations.
President Bush called PRC President Hu on July 6 to urge “one voice” in
international pressure on North Korea, but Hu expressed “deep concerns” about the
“situation” and opposition to actions that might “aggravate the situation.”  On July
7, with U.S. support, Japan sponsored a UNSC resolution that invoked Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter (language for sanctions and/or force), but China countered with
a non-binding statement by the president of the Security Council with no mention of
Chapter VII.  China’s draft statement of July 10 called for resuming the Six-Party
Talks, preventing technology and financial transfers to North Korea’s missile and
WMD programs, and other voluntary measures.  With resistance from Beijing, Tokyo
and Washington agreed on July 10 to postpone a vote on their draft resolution to give
China time for a diplomatic mission.
China sent a previously-scheduled delegation led by Vice Premier Hui Liangyu
to Pyongyang on July 10-15 to commemorate the 45th anniversary of the bilateral
friendship treaty, and Hui signed a new agreement on economic cooperation, but Kim
Jong-il snubbed the visitors.  While China was given time for diplomacy, Beijing
intensified its criticism of Tokyo on July 11, calling its resolution an “overreaction.”
On the same day, PRC ruler Hu Jintao critically told a high-level DPRK delegation
in Beijing that China is seriously concerned about “the new complicating factors.”
Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill reported from Beijing on July 12 that China’s
diplomatic mission did not achieve progress in getting Pyongyang back to the talks.
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On July 12, China (and Russia) dropped their pursuit of a draft statement to
sponsor a draft UNSC resolution that countered Japan’s resolution primarily by
withholding authority under Chapter VII (for sanctions or use of force).  Nonetheless,
China’s resolution called for nations to resume the Six-Party Talks and refrain from
supplying technology or funds to the DPRK’s missile program.  Despite similar
goals, Beijing’s envoy explicitly threatened a veto against Japan’s resolution.
Negotiations led to UNSC Resolution 1695 that was adopted unanimously on
July 15, 2006, condemning the DPRK’s missile launches, demanding that it suspend
its missile program, requiring all countries to prevent technology transfers to its
missile or WMD programs, requiring countries to prevent missile proliferation from
the DPRK and financial transfers to its missile or WMD programs, as well as urging
the DPRK in particular to show restraint and to return to the Six-Party Talks (with
implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement and abandonment of all
nuclear weapons and nuclear programs).  However, China’s statement on the
resolution urged all countries to practice restraint.  Still, in her public reaction the
next day, Secretary of State Rice maintained that North Korea was “isolated” and
singled out China for voting “affirmatively” for the resolution, stressing that it
requires countries to prevent dangerous technology transfers to North Korea.  While
in St. Petersburg, Russia, the next day, for the Group of Eight summit, President
Bush thanked President Hu for his “leadership” on the resolution.  On July 26, 2006,
the White House spokesman confirmed reports that in late 2005, China had frozen
North Korean assets in the Bank of China for counterfeiting the PRC currency.46
Nonetheless, at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 20,
2006, Chairman Richard Lugar pointed out that China facilitates talks on the DPRK
while continuing to supply key energy and lifelines into North Korea.  He warned
that China wants to avoid regional instability but the missiles tests were
destabilizing; China’s ability to secure global benefits for its high economic growth
rates depends on continued cooperation with the West; and “Beijing must reassess
its regional priorities.”  It remains to be seen whether China would support use of
Chapter VII, although Assistant Secretary Hill testified that the resolution’s language
on “international peace and security” was a reference to Chapter VII.
Missile Technology Sales to Libya
Beginning in 2000, public reports appeared on PRC assistance to Libya’s
missile program.  The Defense Department discovered in December 1999 that the
PRC had plans to build a hypersonic wind tunnel in Libya for missile design,
reported the Washington Times (January 21, 2000).  A classified March 2, 2000
report by the NSA was said by the newspaper to describe the PRC’s missile
technology transfer to Libya that month, helping Libya to develop the Al Fatah
SRBM with a range of 600 miles.  CPMIEC allegedly began cooperating with Libya
in March 1999, according to the Washington Times (April 13, 2000).  The June 30,
2000 Washington Times, citing a classified NSA report, said that the PRC was
training Libyan missile experts at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and
Astronautics.  Aside from wind tunnels, PRC aid has also covered navigational and
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guidance systems, reported Jane’s Defense Weekly (February 13, 2002).  The DCI’s
August 2000 report publicly confirmed PRC missile assistance to Libya for the first
time.  The DCI’s November 2003 report said that in the first half of 2003, Libya
continued to depend on assistance from PRC and other “entities” for developing
ballistic missiles.  A report in February 2004 said that the Pakistani network headed
by A.Q. Khan sold Libya a nuclear bomb design that originated in China, raising
questions about China’s role in and knowledge about proliferation.47  However, after
Libya agreed to abandon WMD programs, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported on August
18, 2004, that inspectors found that Libya had not built a wind tunnel.
Missile Technology Sales to Syria
A Pentagon report in 2001 said that PRC firms, in addition to North Korean and
Russian entities, contributed equipment and technology to Syria’s liquid fuel missile
program.48  However, while criticizing North Korean and Russian assistance to
Syria’s ballistic missile development, Under Secretary of State John Bolton did not
cite PRC help at a speech at the Heritage Foundation on May 6, 2002.  The DCI’s
public reports have not specified PRC assistance for Syria’s missile program.
Missile Technology Sales to Iraq
In the unclassified “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI
on Iraq’s WMD,” issued on September 30, 2004, Charles Duelfer provided some
details about Iraq’s past procurement efforts from a number of countries, including
China, before the war that began in 2003.  The top three countries with entities
receiving oil vouchers were Russia (30%), France (15%), and China (10%).  “Firms
in China” supplied Iraq with “limited but critical items, including gyroscopes,
accelerometers, graphite, and telecommunications.”  In mid-2001, an unidentified
PRC firm reportedly supplied 10-20 gyros and 20 accelerometers for use in Iraq’s Al-
Samud ballistic missile.  PRC supplies provided Iraq with “prohibited items, mainly
telecommunication equipment and items with ballistic missile applications.”  The
report referred to unnamed and named entities in China that supplied missile-related
technology, including NORINCO, “Chinese High Committee for Electronic
Warfare,” CIEC Company, SIAM Premium Products, and CPMIEC.  The report also
noted that “from 2002, until the beginning of hostilities in 2003, Iraq imported rocket
guidance software from China disguised as children’s computer software.  The
software was used to guide the missiles Iraq fired at U.S. Forces in Kuwait during the
initial hostilities in 2003.  Iraq paid for the software with hard currency or oil.”
Nonetheless, the report contended that “there is no evidence to suggest Chinese
Government complicity in supplying prohibited goods to Iraq.  It is likely that newly
privatized state-owned companies were willing to circumvent export controls and
official U.N. monitoring to supply prohibited goods.”  The report also alluded to
indications that the PRC government had intervened in some deals to stop them.
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Policy Issues and Options
Issues for Policy
Weapons proliferation by the PRC and/or its organizations raises policy issues
concerning: (1) assessments of the nature and seriousness of the PRC government’s
role in the proliferation threat; (2) the priority of this issue relative to other U.S.
interests (i.e., other security issues, Taiwan, trade, human rights); and (3) U.S.
leadership and leverage (including the use of sanctions and diplomacy, and
congressional actions) to obtain China’s cooperation in nonproliferation.
Debate.  Successive Administrations have pursued a policy of “engagement”
with Beijing.  Some policymakers and advocates stress a cooperative approach.  In
1998, President Clinton issued certifications to implement the 1985 Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement. The Clinton Administration also encouraged the PRC to
join the MTCR and proposed to allow more PRC satellite launches.  In November
2000, the State Department agreed to waive sanctions and consider new satellite
exports in return for another missile non-proliferation pledge from China.  Some
officials and experts cite PRC nonproliferation statements as signs that the United
States made progress in nonproliferation goals.  Some also say that U.S. sanctions are
counterproductive and are too broad.  Rather, they note that China needs to recognize
nonproliferation for its own national interests and develop stronger export controls,
perhaps with U.S. assistance.  Also, some stress that China would be more
cooperative if brought in to draw up “the rules.”  Some argue that “entities” in China
largely operate without the PRC government’s knowledge.
Critics argue that the “engagement” policy needs a tougher approach to counter
China’s activities that undermine U.S. security interests.  They note that PRC
weapons proliferation activities have continued and repeated PRC assurances have
proved to be unreliable.  Also, they say that U.S. security interests are better served
with a stronger approach to deter China’s transfers, which may include appropriate
sanctions.  Some argue that the United States should not “subsidize” China’s missile
and nuclear industries.  These proponents tend to see the U.S. position as stronger
than China’s.  Some are skeptical that China sees nonproliferation as in its national
interest, since Beijing has made progress in nonproliferation commitments as part of
improving relations with Washington (surrounding summits) and tried to use its sales
as a form of leverage against Washington, especially on the issue of U.S. arms sales
to Taiwan.  They note that PRC export controls are weak, even as government
repression can be harsh (e.g., against Falungong practitioners). They also doubt that
trade in sensitive nuclear weapons and missile technology can continue without the
knowledge of the PRC government and/or its military, especially given the status of
certain state-owned and defense-industrial enterprises as “serial proliferators.”
The PRC Government’s Role.  Concerning the debate about any knowledge
or approval of the PRC government, at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services
Committee on March 19, 2002, DCI George Tenet told Senator Carl Levin that while
PRC firms sometimes operate on their own, there are instances in which “activities
are condoned by the government.”  The DCI’s January 2003 report to Congress noted
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that PRC entities could have continued contacts with Pakistani nuclear weapons
facilities “without Beijing’s knowledge or permission,” but this comment was
dropped from the April 2003 report.  The Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, testified to the Senate Intelligence
Committee on February 24, 2004, that PRC entities “remain involved with nuclear
and missile programs in Pakistan and Iran,” while “in some cases,” the entities are
involved without the government’s knowledge, implying that there might be cases
in which the PRC government has knowledge of the relationships.  The Bush
Administration waived missile proliferation sanctions on certain activities of the PRC
government on September 19, 2003; September 18, 2004; and March 18, 2005.
No matter what options are pursued, many argue that U.S. leadership and a
forward-looking and credible strategy are needed for dealing with China’s rising
influence in world affairs.  A strategic approach might underpin short-term responses
to violations and use both positive and negative sources of leverage.  Policy issues
have often centered on summitry, sanctions, and satellite exports.
Foreign and Defense Policies
Summits.  After the downturn in U.S.-PRC relations because of  the 1989
Tiananmen crackdown, the Clinton Administration resumed high-level exchanges in
1993 and argued that “comprehensive engagement” with China advances U.S.
security goals, including nonproliferation.  President Clinton granted Jiang Zemin
summits in Washington, on October 29, 1997, and in Beijing, on June 29, 1998.
Leading up to the 1997 summit, the Administration urged China to adopt
“comprehensive, nationwide regulations on nuclear export control.”  China
responded by implementing a set of regulations on nuclear export controls signed by
Premier Li Peng on September 10, 1997.  The regulations permit nuclear exports to
only facilities under IAEA safeguards.  China also joined the Zangger Committee (on
nuclear trade) on October 16, 1997.  Then, China issued new export control
regulations on dual-use nuclear items on June 17, 1998.  The 1998 summit in Beijing
produced an agreement on non-targeting nuclear weapons, and joint statements on
South Asia and on biological weapons.  But China refused to join the MTCR, saying
that it was “actively studying” whether to join.  
President Bush raised the unresolved missile proliferation issue in  Shanghai in
October 2001 and in Beijing in February 2002.  As Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage arrived in Beijing to discuss the Bush-Jiang summit in Crawford, TX, on
October 25, 2002, China, on August 25, 2002, published the missile export control
regulations promised in November 2000, along with a control list that is modeled on
the MTCR.  In addition, on October 14, 2002, the PRC issued regulations for export
controls over dual-use biological agents.  China continued to approach weapon
nonproliferation as more a part of the U.S.-PRC relationship than a commitment to
international nonproliferation standards.  At that summit, President Bush called
China an “ally” in the fight against terrorism.
With the improvement in U.S.-PRC relations, however, some observers say that
President Bush has not forcefully pressed China’s leaders on weapons
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nonproliferation as a priority issue, even while imposing numerous U.S. sanctions.49
Briefing reporters on President Bush’s meeting with PRC President Hu Jintao in
France on June 1, 2003, a senior White House official acknowledged that the two
leaders did not discuss U.S. sanctions on NORINCO (which the Administration had
just imposed on May 23, 2003, for missile technology transfers to Iran) and that
President Hu did not respond to Bush’s general concerns about Iran’s nuclear
weapons program.50  In Thailand in October 2003, at another meeting between the
two presidents, Bush noted that they had a “very constructive dialogue” on trade,
Iraq, counter-terrorism, and North Korea, but he did not mention weapons
proliferation as an issue with China, although the Administration had imposed
another set of missile proliferation sanctions on NORINCO a month earlier.51  While
the White House hosted PRC Premier Wen Jiabao on December 9, 2003, a senior
official told reporters that “the President applauded the new Chinese white paper on
nonproliferation but noted that there is a need for tough implementation of the
commitments contained in that white paper” (just issued on December 3, 2003, on
the eve of Wen’s visit).  But again, Bush did not highlight the issue of weapons
proliferation with China in his public remarks.52
Counter-Terrorism Campaign.  The terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, added a compelling U.S. interest in considering U.S. policy on PRC weapons
proliferation.  With questions about the viability of Pakistan’s government after it
gave strong support to the anti-terrorism war, the United States could seek
intelligence from the PRC about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as well as cooperation
in not further adding to instability in South Asia.  Also, the Bush Administration
could maintain or strengthen its response to the proliferation problem, since PRC
entities have reportedly transferred nuclear, missile, and/or chemical weapons
technology to sponsors of terrorism (listed by the State Department), such as Iran.
If the Administration lifts sanctions for cooperating countries, options include
waiving proliferation sanctions on the PRC.  (Also see CRS Report RL33001, U.S.-
China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy, by Shirley Kan.)
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In his January 29, 2002 State of the Union speech, Bush identified the two
primary threats as terrorism and weapons proliferation.  He then issued the National
Security Strategy on September 20, 2002, warning:
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and
technology.  Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of
mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with
determination.  The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed.  We
will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery.  We
will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’
efforts to acquire dangerous technologies.  And, as a matter of common sense
and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are
fully formed. ...
Missile Defense, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  Some say that
missile defense should play a critical role in the strategy to counter the proliferation
threat.  Others say the September 2001 attacks increased doubts about the likelihood
of terrorists using missiles for weapons delivery.  China has opposed U.S.
deployment of missile defense systems and related cooperation with Japan or Taiwan
and threatened to significantly increase its nuclear missile force.  China is concerned
that missile defense would spur an arms race, negate its deterrence capabilities, forge
closer U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation, and violate the MTCR.  During Defense
Secretary William Cohen’s visit to China in July 2000, the PRC reportedly warned
that it would continue missile proliferation activities if the United States provides
missile defense to Taiwan (Washington Post, July 12, 2000).  Also, top PRC arms
control official Sha Zukang warned that the PRC would withhold cooperation on
arms control and weapons nonproliferation in response to U.S. deployment of NMD,
reported the Washington Post (July 14, 2000).  Others say that PRC proliferation
activities and missile buildups would continue regardless.
On December 11, 2002, President Bush issued his National Strategy to Combat
WMD, resting on the three pillars of counter-proliferation, nonproliferation, and
response.  The first pillar, counter-proliferation, included interdiction, deterrence, and
defense (including preemptive measures and missile defenses).  
On May 31, 2003, in Poland, President Bush announced the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) to step up multinational efforts at interdiction and
intelligence-sharing.  The United States faces a challenge in obtaining China’s
cooperation in counter-proliferation (e.g., interdiction of shipments, inspections, or
intelligence-sharing), given its long-lasting negative and emotional reaction to U.S.
inspection in 1993 of the PRC ship, Yinhe, which was suspected of carrying
chemicals for Iran.  Also, China might have greater doubts about the credibility of
U.S. intelligence after President Bush launched the highly controversial war on Iraq
in 2003 and failed to find WMD in Iraq.  The 9/11 Commission issued its final report
on July 22, 2004, and it urged that the United States encourage China (and Russia)
to join the PSI, among many recommendations. 
China has not joined the PSI.  China did not join the 11 original members of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) plus Norway, Denmark, Singapore, and Canada
in sending representatives to a meeting in Washington on December 16-17, 2003,
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even though it took place just days after Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit.53  In October
2004, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed concerns that the PSI might
allow “military interception, which is beyond the limits of international law.”54
Nonetheless, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
John Bolton visited Beijing on February 16, 2004, and he revealed that “in the past
several years, we have had cooperation with China in some interdiction efforts.”
While in Tokyo on October 27, 2004, Bolton said in a speech that “we are pleased
with China’s cooperation with the United States to block the export of chemicals that
could have been used in North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.”
  
Export Control Assistance.  The United States may provide assistance to
strengthen China’s export controls, including the areas of legislation, regulations,
licensing, customs, border security, and law-enforcement.  The Departments of
Commerce and State testified to the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services on June 6, 2002, that such
bilateral exchanges were very limited.
Linkage to the Taiwan Issue.  Periodically, China has tried to link the
issues of missile proliferation and U.S. conventional arms sales for Taiwan’s defense.
Congress has exercised oversight of the Administration’s response to any direct or
indirect linkage.  During the 1998 summit in Beijing, the Clinton White House
reportedly considered a PRC request for a U.S. pledge to deny missile defense sales
to Taiwan, if China promised to stop missile sales to Iran; but no agreement was
reached, reported the Far Eastern Economic Review (July 16, 1998).  On February
26, 2002, before the Director General in charge of arms control at the PRC Foreign
Ministry, Liu Jieyi, attended meetings in Washington on March 4-6, an unnamed
PRC foreign ministry official told the Associated Press that the United States “can’t
just accuse us of violating our commitments and at the same sell large amounts of
arms to Taiwan,” since such arms sales are “also a kind of proliferation.”  On July
24, 2004, Wen Wei Po, a PRC-owned newspaper in Hong Kong, quoted an unnamed
high-level official of the PRC Foreign Ministry as linking weapons nonproliferation
to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  Nonetheless, State Department officials have said that
China has not posed Taiwan as a “tactical issue” in discussions about North Korea.
(See discussion on North Korea above.)  The Administration has cited the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA) as committing the United States to provide defense articles and
services to help Taiwan’s sufficient self-defense.  (See also CRS Report RL30957,
Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley Kan.)
Economic Controls
Satellite Exports.  There have been debates about U.S. policy using satellite
exports to gain China’s cooperation in missile nonproliferation.  Since 1988, the
policy of granting licenses to export satellites to China as well as Presidential waivers
of post-Tiananmen sanctions (Section 902 of P.L. 101-246) have allowed satellites
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to be exported for launch by China Great Wall Industry Corp. (the same company
sanctioned for missile proliferation) and — increasingly — for China’s own use.
During the Clinton Administration, the National Security Council, in a reported
Secret memo on bilateral talks leading up to the 1998 summit (dated March 12, 1998,
and printed in the March 23, 1998 Washington Times), proposed to expand space
cooperation, increase the number of satellite launches, issue a blanket Presidential
waiver of sanctions, and support China’s membership in the MTCR — in return for
PRC missile export controls.  On November 21, 2000, the State Department said it
would waive sanctions, again process — not necessarily approve — licenses
(suspended in February 2000) to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension
of the bilateral space launch agreement (which later expired at the end of 2001), in
return for another PRC promise on missile nonproliferation.
However, on September 1, 2001, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions
for two years on a PRC company, the China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation
(MECC), for proliferation of missile technology to Pakistan, denying satellite exports
to China.  Before those sanctions expired, the State Department determined on
August 29, 2003, that NORINCO substantially contributed to missile proliferation
of Category II MTCR items and imposed sanctions that again effectively banned
satellite exports to China.  (See Sanctions below.)  The last Presidential waiver for
satellite exports to China was issued in February 1998.  (See also CRS Report 98-
485, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers Under U.S. Satellite Export
Policy — Actions and Chronology, by Shirley Kan.)
Sanctions and the “Helms Amendment”.  Policy debates concerning
PRC technology transfers have often centered on the questions of whether to impose
unilateral sanctions under U.S. laws, to enact new legislation to tighten mandates for
sanctions or reports, or to integrate the multiple laws.  Also, there have been the
issues of whether to target the PRC government or PRC “entities” (usually state-
owned defense industrial organizations, like CPMIEC or NORINCO) and whether
the PRC government lacks the will or the capability to enforce its stated
nonproliferation policy.  Decisions on sanctions impact U.S. credibility and leverage
on the non-proliferation issue.  While certain PRC transfers may not violate any
international treaties, sanctions may be required under U.S. laws that Congress
passed to set U.S. nonproliferation policy and shore up nonproliferation treaties and
standards.  These laws, as amended, include:
! Export-Import Bank Act (P.L. 79-173)
! Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629)
! Export Administration Act (EAA) (P.L. 96-72)
! Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (Title VIII of P.L. 103-236)
! Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484)
! Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178)
! Executive Order 12938, as amended by Executive Order 13094
(On legislation requiring sanctions to address weapons proliferation, see also CRS
Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation
Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by Dianne Rennack.)
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Underlying the question of whether sanctions should be used are disagreements
about the most effective approach for curbing dangerous PRC sales and promoting
U.S. interests and leadership.  Some argue that a cooperative approach, rather than
sanctions, is more effective.  Others say that current sanctions are not effective in
countering the PRC’s proliferation practices (especially with certain entities being
repeatedly sanctioned, negligible penalties, and sanctions targeting companies but not
the government) and that legislation requiring sanctions should be toughened.  Still
others say current sanctions serve to stress the problem in certain countries, signal
U.S. resolve, and shore up credibility on this important security issue.
As for whether to impose or waive missile proliferation sanctions, on November
21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions,
again process — not necessarily approve — licenses to export satellites to China, and
discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for a new PRC
pledge on missile nonproliferation and a promise to issue missile export controls.
However, continued PRC transfers again raised the issue of imposing sanctions.
By July 2001, the United States formally protested to China about its compliance
with the agreement, reported the Washington Post (July 27, 2001).  Visiting Beijing
ahead of President Bush’s trip to Shanghai in October 2001, Secretary of State Colin
Powell, on July 28, 2001, noted “outstanding issues” about China’s implementation
of its November 2000 commitment.
On 16 occasions, the Bush Administration has imposed sanctions on PRC
entities (not the PRC government) for transfers (related to ballistic missiles, chemical
weapons, and cruise missiles) to Pakistan and Iran, under the Arms Export Control
Act, Export Administration Act, Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act of 1992, Executive Order 12938, and Executive Order 13382.
(See Table 1: PRC Entities Sanctioned for Weapons Proliferation.)
Among the actions, on September 1, 2001, the Bush Administration imposed
sanctions (for two years) on a PRC company, the China Metallurgical Equipment
Corporation (CMEC), for proliferation of missile technology (Category II items) to
Pakistan.  The sanctions had the effect of denying licenses for two years for the
export of satellites to China for its use or launch by its aerospace entities, because the
Category II sanctions deny U.S. licenses to transfer missile equipment or technology
(MTCR Annex items) to any PRC “person,” which is defined by the so-called
“Helms Amendment” (Section 74(a)(8)(B) of the AECA, P.L. 90-629) as all PRC
government activity affecting the development or production of missiles, electronics,
space systems, and military aircraft, and the State Department considers that satellites
are covered by the MTCR Annex (since it includes satellite parts).  
In Beijing with the President in February 2002, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice said that the PRC should stop “grandfathering” contracts signed
before November 2000.  On August 25, 2002, the PRC published missile export
control regulations (promised in November 2000), just before Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage arrived in Beijing to discuss an upcoming Bush-Jiang
summit, showing that China still viewed nonproliferation in the context of relations
with the United States.  Armitage welcomed the new regulations but added that
further discussions were needed.  The State Department spokesperson stressed that
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questions remained about enforcement of the controls and reductions in PRC
proliferation practices.  With questions about enforcement and effectiveness of the
controls, President Bush did not waive the sanctions imposed in September 2001.
Moreover, the regulations raised a number of questions, including the roles of
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.  Part 1 of that control list (missiles and other delivery systems)
and dual-use items (in Part 2) for military use are subject to the Regulations on
Administering Arms Exports issued in 1997, under the jurisdiction of the State
Council and Central Military Commission (China’s military command).  Also, unlike
the MTCR, the PRC’s regulations on missile-related exports do not state a strong
presumption to deny transfers of Category I items or any missiles or other items
judged to be intended to deliver any WMD.
In the 107th Congress, Senator Thompson inserted a section in the FY2003
National Defense Authorization Act (enacted on December 2, 2002, as Section 1209
in P.L. 107-314) to require the DCI to submit semi-annual reports that identify PRC
and other foreign entities contributing to weapons proliferation.  However, in signing
the legislation, President Bush stated that he would construe this and several other
sections in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to
withhold information, if disclosure could harm foreign relations, national security,
or the Executive Branch’s duties.
Before the September 2001 sanctions expired, the State Department determined
on August 29, 2003, that NORINCO substantially contributed to missile proliferation
of Category II MTCR items in a publicly unidentified country and imposed sanctions
for two years that ban the issuance to NORINCO of export licenses or U.S.
government contracts for missile equipment or technology, and that ban the
importation of NORINCO’s products.  
The “Helms Amendment” again applied — denying exports of satellites to
China, but the Bush Administration contended that it was “essential to national
security” to waive for one year the sanction on imports when applied to other PRC
government activities relating to missiles, electronics, space systems, and military
aircraft.  The sanctions took effect on September 19, 2003.  Within a year, the
Administration had to decide on the broader sanctions on imports of non-NORINCO
products, which could affect an estimated $12 billion in imports from the PRC.55
Meanwhile, in April 2004, the Commerce Department agreed to review whether to
change China’s “non-market economy” status, based upon which the “Helms
Amendment” has broadened missile proliferation sanctions.  On September 18, 2004,
the State Department extended the waiver on the import sanction against certain
activities of the PRC government for six more months.  On March 18, 2005, the State
Department again extended the waiver for six months.  The State Department again
extended the waiver for six months beginning on September 18, 2005.
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Capital Markets.  During the 106th Congress, in May 2000, Senator
Thompson, along with Senator Torricelli, introduced S. 2645, the “China
Nonproliferation Act,” to require annual reviews (based on “credible information”),
sanctions, and use of the U.S. securities market as a policy tool.  (In  September
2000, the Senate passed (65-32) a motion to table the legislation as an amendment
to the bill granting China permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status.)  
In the 107th Congress, Senator Thompson inserted a section in the FY2003
Intelligence Authorization Act (enacted on November 27, 2002, as Section 827 in
P.L. 107-306) to require the DCI to submit annual reports on PRC and other foreign
companies that are involved in weapons proliferation and raise funds in U.S. capital
markets.  Reporting the bill on May 13, 2002, the Senate Intelligence Committee (in
S.Rept. 107-149) added that it did not intend to restrict access to those markets.  The
108th Congress passed the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 108-177) that
included Section 361(e) to repeal the above reporting requirement.
Nuclear Cooperation and U.S. Export of Reactors.  After the PRC
promised not to start new nuclear cooperation with Iran on the eve of the 1997 U.S.-
China summit, President Clinton, on January 12, 1998, signed certifications (as
required by P.L. 99-183) on China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices to
implement the 1985 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.  According to President
Clinton, the agreement would serve U.S. national security, environmental, and
economic interests, and “the United States and China share a strong interest in
stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other sophisticated weaponry
in unstable regions and rogue states — notably, Iran.”  The President also waived a
sanction imposed after the Tiananmen crackdown (in P.L. 101-246).  Later, at the
1998 summit, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the PRC State Planning
Commission signed an agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation, including
bringing PRC scientists to U.S. national labs, universities, and nuclear reactor
facilities.  (See also CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement, by Shirley Kan and Mark Holt.)
During debate on the agreement, some in Congress, the nonproliferation
community, and elsewhere were skeptical that PRC policies changed sufficiently to
warrant the certifications and that they served U.S. interests.  They also pointed out
that China had not yet joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group.  Congressional review
ended on March 18, 1998, and the agreement has since been implemented.  U.S.
firms may apply for Export-Import Bank financing and licenses from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and DOE to export nuclear technology to China, and
foreign firms may apply to re-export U.S. technology.  Some Members pursued
several options to affect the agreement’s implementation.  On November 5, 1997, the
House passed a bill with an amendment sponsored by Representative Gilman,
chairman of the Committee on International Relations, to extend congressional
review for implementation of the agreement from 30 to 120 days and provide for
expedited review procedures.  As amended by Representative Gilman, the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY1999 (P.L. 105-261) requires the President to
notify Congress “upon” granting licenses for nuclear exports to a non-NATO country
that has detonated a nuclear explosive device (e.g., China).
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However, Nucleonics Week (March 23, 2000) and the Washington Times (May
9, 2000) reported that the Clinton Administration had not obtained from China an
overall assurance that it will not re-export U.S. technology to another country, such
as Pakistan, thus affecting the issuance of export licenses.  As required, the State
Department, on June 9, 2000, issued the first notification to Congress that NRC
issued a license on February 3, 2000, for the export of tantalite ore to China.  The
Administration issued this and subsequent licenses based on case-by-case assurances
from Beijing of no re-transfers.  Finally, on September 16, 2003, the Department of
Energy and China’s Atomic Energy Authority agreed on a Statement of Intent
concerning assurances from China that nuclear technology would not be retransferred
by China to third parties or used in China’s nuclear weapons program.
On February 28, 2005, Westinghouse (along with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries)
submitted a bid to sell four nuclear power reactors to China, with the NRC’s
approval.  The Bush Administration has supported Westinghouse’s bid to sell nuclear
reactors to China.56  However, critics say that the United States, including its Export-
Import Bank, should not support nuclear exports to China, given proliferation
issues.57  On June 28, 2005, Representative Bernard Sanders introduced Amendment
381 to the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Relations Programs
Appropriations Act for FY2006 (H.R. 3057) to prohibit funds from being used by the
Export-Import Bank to approve an application for a loan or loan guarantee for a
nuclear project in the PRC.  The House adopted the amendment (313-114) and
passed H.R. 3057 on June 28, 2005, with the language in Section 589.  However, this
section was dropped in the conference committee (H.Rept. 109-265).
U.S. Import Controls.  While sanctions may affect U.S. exports, some policy
steps may affect imports of products produced by PRC military or defense-industrial
companies suspected of contributing to proliferation.  Import controls have been
included as possible sanctions for missile proliferation under Section 73(a)(2)(C) of
the AECA and Section 11B(b)(1)(B)(iii) of the EAA, as well as affected by what is
popularly called the “Helms Amendment,” giving a broad definition of “person” as
a target of sanctions.  Issues include whether to sanction imports and what the
parameters should be.  (See Sanctions and the “Helms Amendment.”)
U.S. Export Controls.  Export controls are a possible policy tool, because
U.S. technology provides one source of leverage with respect to Beijing. After the
Cold War, U.S. export restrictions have been re-focused to the threat of  WMD and
missiles.  Some in Congress are concerned about U.S. technology reaching hostile
states with WMD programs through China.  U.S. arms sales to China have been
banned under sanctions imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown (in the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-1991, P.L. 101-246), but there are
competing economic interests in exporting dual-use technology.
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Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Nonproliferation Regimes (MTCR, NSG, etc.).  Another policy approach
is to strengthen the international nonproliferation regimes.  There are two prongs in
such efforts:  (1) encouraging PRC support for strengthening the regimes (e.g., the
IAEA’s verification authority) to enforce compliance and (2) filling gaps in China’s
participation.  Some say that efforts to include China would capitalize on its desire
to be treated as a “great power” and to be perceived as a responsible world leader.
In addition, they stress that China would be more cooperative if it helped to draw up
the “rules.”  Others argue that China’s participation would risk its obstruction of
tighter export controls, possible derailing of arms control efforts, linkage of
nonproliferation issues to the Taiwan issue, and access to intelligence-sharing.  One
basis for this view is the experience with the Arms Control in the Middle East effort
in the early 1990s, in which China refused to cover missiles in the effort and later
suspended its participation after President George H.W. Bush decided in 1992 to sell
Taiwan F-16 fighters.
Options for U.S. policy have included support or opposition to China joining the
MTCR (as a member after it establishes a record of compliance and effective export
controls), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia Group (on chemical and
biological weapons), Wassenaar Arrangement (military and dual-use export controls),
and International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
Previously, President Clinton’s National Security Council, in a reported Secret
memo, dated March 12, 1998 (printed in the March 23, 1998 Washington Times),
proposed in a “China missile deal” to expand space cooperation with Beijing,
increase the number of satellites that China can launch, issue a blanket Presidential
waiver of post-Tiananmen sanctions on satellite launches, and support China’s
membership in the MTCR — in return for effective PRC missile export controls.
Critics say that membership in the MTCR would exempt China from certain
sanctions, provide it with intelligence, give it a potentially obstructionist role in
decision-making, and relax missile-related export controls to China.  In September
1999, Congress passed the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-
65), stating its sense that the President shall take steps to obtain an agreement with
the PRC on adherence to the MTCR and its annex and that the PRC should not be
allowed to join the MTCR without meeting certain conditions.  It also required a
report on the PRC’s adherence to the MTCR.  The classified report was submitted
on August 18, 2000.  In June 2004, China expressed willingness to join the MTCR.
China joined the Zangger Committee (on nuclear trade) in October 1997, before
a summit in Washington.  Also, China issued new export control regulations on dual-
use nuclear items on June 17, 1998, before another summit in Beijing.  
For years, China was the only major nuclear supplier to shun the multinational
NSG, which requires “full-scope safeguards” (IAEA inspections of all other declared
nuclear facilities in addition to the facility importing supplies to prevent diversions
to weapon programs).  In January 2004, China applied to join the NSG.  However,
on May 5, 2004, China signed a contract to build a second nuclear power reactor
(Chashma-2) in Pakistan.  This contract raised questions because of continuing PRC
nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and its signing right before a decision by the NSG
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on China’s membership.  With a pre-existing contract, Chashma-2 would be
exempted from the NSG’s requirement for full-scope safeguards.58  The Bush
Administration decided to support China’s membership, after reportedly strident
debate between officials who questioned China’s commitment to nonproliferation
and those who wanted to encourage China’s further cooperation.59  
On May 18, 2004, the House International Relations Committee held a hearing
to question whether the Administration should support China’s membership in the
NSG, given concerns about PRC nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and Iran, about
whether China would be a spoiler in the NSG, and about loss of U.S. leverage.
Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf testified that the United States has urged
China to join the NSG since 1995, that China has not been a spoiler in the Zangger
Committee, and that NSG membership would add multilateral influence on China’s
nuclear technology export policies.  Wolf conceded, however, that Pakistan has a
nuclear weapons program and does not accept full-scope safeguards, and that the
United States prefers that no country provide Pakistan with benefits of peaceful
nuclear cooperation.  He noted that the Chashma-2 plant will be under IAEA
safeguards, but the NSG exempts full-scope safeguards for contracts signed before
NSG membership.  Wolf also acknowledged that the Administration did not request
that China use its influence with Islamabad to secure tighter Pakistani export
controls.  Moreover, he conceded that the Administration has not seen the contract
for Chashma-2 nor received the requested “full information” on any ongoing nuclear
cooperation projects that China seeks to grandfather.  A memo dated May 26, 2004,
by the Project for the New American Century criticized the Administration’s decision
for turning a “blind eye to China’s reactor sales to Pakistan.”  The NSG decided at
a meeting on May 28 to accept China as a member.  
The Bush Administration raised a further question when it announced on July
18, 2005, that it desired to begin nuclear cooperation with India, despite its nuclear
tests.  At the NSG, the Administration has sought an exemption from full-scope
safeguards for India, based on its nonproliferation record.  However, China, as an
NSG member, is expected also to seek an exemption for it to export additional
nuclear power reactors to Pakistan, an exemption opposed by the United States and
the NSG.60
CTBT and Fissile Materials Production.  China, on July 30, 1996, began
a moratorium on nuclear testing and signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996.
However, after the U.S. Senate rejected (51-48) the treaty on October 13, 1999, it
became doubtful that the PRC would ratify the CTBT.  Also, the United States has
sought PRC cooperation on negotiating a global ban on the production of fissile
materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.  On October 4,
1994, the United States and China agreed to “work together to promote the earliest
possible achievement of a multilateral, non-discriminatory, and effective verifiable
convention” banning fissile materials production.
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International Lending and Japan
Congress might seek to link U.S. support for loans made by international
financial institutions to China’s nonproliferation record.  The Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act requires U.S. opposition to multilateral loans for sanctioned
countries (Section 1605(b)(2)).  Coordination with Japan is important, since it
provides the most significant bilateral aid to China and, in 1995, was the only country
to cut aid to pressure China to stop nuclear testing.  By 2005, some in Congress have
increasingly questioned the World Bank’s continued lending to China despite the
government’s wealth of funds.61  The World Bank extended $1.2 billion in total loans
to China in the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 2004.62
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Table 1.  PRC Entities Sanctioned for Weapons Proliferation
Entity/Person Reason: Statutes Effective Dates
- China Great Wall Industry Corporation
- China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corp.
(CPMIEC)
Missile Proliferation:
§73(a)(2)(A), Arms Export Control Act
§11B(b)(1)(B)(i), Export Administration Act




Ministry of Aerospace Industry, including CPMIEC,
and related entities, including:
- China National Space Administration
- China Aerospace Corp.
- Aviation Industries of China
- CPMIEC
- China Great Wall Industry Corp. or Group
- Chinese Academy of Space Technology
- Beijing Wan Yuan Industry Corp. (aka Wanyuan
Company or China Academy of Launch Vehicle
Technology)
- China Haiying Company
- Shanghai Astronautics Industry Bureau
- China Chang Feng Group (aka China Changfeng
Company)
Missile Proliferation:
§73(a)(2)(A), Arms Export Control Act
§11B(b)(1)(B)(i), Export Administration Act













- Nanjing Chemical Industries Group
- Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and Technology
Import/Export Corp.
1 Hong Kong company:
- Cheong Yee Ltd.
CW Proliferation:
§81(c), Arms Export Control Act
§11C(c), Export Administration Act
(dual-use chemical precursors, equipment, and/or technology to Iran)
May 21, 1997
remain in effect
Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology
Import/Export Corp.
CW/BW Proliferation:
§3, Iran Nonproliferation Act
June 14, 2001
for two years
China Metallurgical Equipment Corp. (aka CMEC,
MECC)
Missile Proliferation:
§73(a)(2)(A), Arms Export Control Act
§11B(b)(1)(B)(i), Export Administration Act
(MTCR Category II items to Pakistan)
Sept. 1, 2001
for two years
- Liyang Chemical Equipment









Entity/Person Reason: Statutes Effective Dates
- Liyang Yunlong (aka Liyang Chemical Equipment Co.)
- Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant (aka Chemet Global
Ltd.)
- China National Machinery and Electric Equipment
Import and Export Co.
- Wha Cheong Tai Co.
- China Shipbuilding Trading Co.
- CPMIEC
- China Aero-Technology Import/ Export Corp. (CATIC)
- Q.C. Chen
Weapons Proliferation:
§3, Iran Nonproliferation Act
(AG-controlled items and conventional weapons-related technology
related to unspecified missiles)
May 9, 2002
for two years
- Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import
Export Corp.
- Q.C. Chen
- China Machinery and Equipment Import Export Corp.
- China National Machinery and Equipment Import
Export Corp.
- CMEC Machinery and Electric Equipment Import
Export Co.
- CMEC Machinery and Electrical Import Export Co.
- China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import
Export Co.
- Wha Cheong Tai Co.
Weapons Proliferation:
§1604(b), Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act 
and 
§81(c), Arms Export Control Act
§11C(c), Export Administration Act
(chemical weapons technology to Iran)
July 9, 2002 
for two years 
for one year
- China Shipbuilding Trading Co. only under Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act
(cruise missile technology)
North China Industries Corporation (NORINCO) Missile Proliferation:
Executive Order 12938 (amended by Executive Order 13094)




Entity/Person Reason: Statutes Effective Dates
- Taian Foreign Trade General Corporation
- Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant








Executive Order 12938 (as amended by Executive Order 13094)




§73(a)(2)(A) and (C), Arms Export Control Act
§11B(b)(1)(B)(i) and (iii), Export Administration Act
(Substantial contribution in proliferation of MTCR Category II
technology to publicly unnamed country)
September 19, 2003
for two years;
waiver for one year on
import ban for non-
NORINCO products;
waiver extended on
September 18, 2004, for
six months; waived for
six months on March 18,
2005; waived for six
months on September
18, 2005; and waived for
six months on March 18,
2006.




- Oriental Scientific Instruments Corporation (OSIC)
- Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant (aka Chemet Global
Ltd., South Industries Science and Technology Trading
Company)
Weapons Proliferation:
§3, Iran Nonproliferation Act
(unspecified transfers to Iran controlled under multilateral export
control lists or having the potential to make a material contribution to




Entity/Person Reason: Statutes Effective Dates
- Xinshidai (aka China Xinshidai Company, XSD, China
New Era Group, or New Era Group)
Missile proliferation:
Executive Order 12938 (as amended by Executive Order 13094)




- Beijing Institute of Aerodynamics
- BIOET
- China Great Wall Industry Corporation
- NORINCO
- LIMMT Economic and Trade Company, Ltd.
- OSIC
- South Industries Science and Technology Trading Co.
Weapons Proliferation:
§3, Iran Nonproliferation Act
(unspecified transfers to Iran controlled under multilateral export
control lists or having the potential to make a material contribution to
WMD or cruise or ballistic missiles)
September 23, 2004
for two years
- Liaoning Jiayi Metals and Minerals Co.
- Q.C. Chen
- Wha Cheong Tai Co. Ltd.
- Shanghai Triple International Ltd.
Weapons Proliferation:
§3, Iran Nonproliferation Act
(unspecified transfers to Iran controlled under multilateral export
control lists or having the potential to make a material contribution to
WMD or cruise or ballistic missiles)
November 24, 2004
for two years
- Beijing Alite Technologies Company Ltd.
- CATIC
- China Great Wall Industry Corporation
- NORINCO
- Q.C. Chen
- Wha Cheong Tai Company (aka Wah Cheong Tai Co.,
Hua Chang Tai Co.)
- Zibo Chemet Equipment Corp. (aka Chemet Global
Ltd)
Weapons Proliferation:
§3, Iran Nonproliferation Act
(unspecified transfers to Iran controlled under multilateral export
control lists or having the potential to make a material contribution to




Entity/Person Reason: Statutes Effective Dates
-CATIC
-NORINCO
-Hongdu Aviation Industry Group
-LIMMT Metallurgy and Minerals Company Ltd.
-Ounion (Asia) International Economic and Technical
Cooperation Ltd.
-Zibo Chemet Equipment Company
Missile and CW Proliferation:
§3, Iran Nonproliferation Act
(unspecified transfers to Iran controlled under multilateral export
control lists or having the potential to make a material contribution to
WMD or cruise or ballistic missiles)
December 23, 2005
for two years
-Beijing Alite Technologies Company Ltd. (ALCO)
-LIMMT Economic and Trade Company Ltd.
-China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC)
-CPMIEC
-G.W. Aerospace (a U.S. office of CGWIC)
Missile Proliferation:
Executive Order 13382
(transfers to Iran’s military and other organizations of missile and dual-
use components, including items controlled by the MTCR)
June 13, 2006
Note:  This table summarizes the discussion of sanctions in this CRS Report and was compiled based on publication of notices in the Federal Register, reports and statements of the
Administration, legislation enacted by Congress, and news reports.
